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Corporate law and academic comment addressing the proper divi-
sion of assets of publicly held corporations  among noncreditor  claim-
ants  have been primarily  concerned  with management's  diversions  of
corporate  assets  to  itself  at  the  expense  of stockholders.'  Less  fre-
quently  noted,  but  by  no  means  infrequently  occurring,  are  the
problems generated by the diversion of corporate  assets to majority  or
controlling  stockholders2  at the  expense  of other stockholders  of the
same class.3  Whether the issue derives from the relationship of parent
and subsidiary corporations  or from transactions involving  individual
shareholders,  problems  arise  in  a wide  variety  of contexts  as to  the
t  Weld Professor of Law, Harvard University.  B.A. 1937,  M.Sc.  1937,  College of the City
of New York; LL.B. 1940, Columbia  University.  I am indebted to Timothy T. Casady for helpful
research  assistance  and to Lucian A. Bebchuk for valuable  criticism.
1.  For example, management may divert corporate  assets to itself by way of self-dealing,
use of corporate  property,  taking  of corporate opportunities  or the like.  The "agency  costs"  of
monitoring  and  preventing such  behavior have  been addressed  by  economists, see, e.g.,  Fama,
Agency Problems and  the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.  288  (1980); Jensen  & Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial  Behavior,  Agency Costs  and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305 (1976),  and lawyers, see, e.g.,  Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness  and Corpo-
rate  Structure, 25  U.C.L.A. L. REv. 738  (1978).  The law policing such costs is a primary compo-
nent of basic coporate  law courses.
2.  The owner of 5% or 10% of the outstanding voting power may possess control.  He need
not own an absolute majority.  For purposes of this Article, any block of stock which is sufficient
to control in fact will be called controlling and its owners may be referred to as a majority.  Those
investors  who  are  not part  of the group  of owners  of the  control block  will be  referred  to as
minority investors, even though in the aggregate  they may own a majority of the stock.
3.  This problem differs from  a determination of the proper distribution of assets  between
two or more classes of investors whose investment contracts explicitly prescribe different  interests
in  the enterprise,  e.g. common  stock  and preferred  stock with  respect to dividend  payments  or
arrearage cancellation, see Brudney, Standards  of  Fairness  and  the Limits of  Preferred  Stock Modi-
fications,  26 RUTGERs  L. REV.  445  (1973)  [hereinafter cited as Brudney, Preferred  Stock Modfca-
Mons], or bondholders and stockholders with respect  to insolvency or other reorganizations,  see
Blum, The Law andLanguage  of Corporate  Reorganization, 17 U. CHI. L. REv.  565 (1950);  Blum,
Full  Priority  and Full Compensation in Corporate  Reorganizations:  A Reappraisal,  25 U.  CHI. L.
RaV. 417 (1958);  Brudney, The Investment Value Doctrine  and  Corporate  Readjustments, 72 HARV.
L. REV.  645 (1959);  Clark, Fair  and  Equitable  Reorganizations  of  Investment Companies,  53 B.U.L.
REV.  1 (1973).  In such cases, each class seeks to cause a rearrangement of participations in corpo-
rate assets which will  maximize value  to it-generally  at the expense of other classes.  See, e.g.,
Broad v. Rockwell  International Corp., 642 F.2d 929  (5th Cir.), cert.  denied, 454 U.S.  965  (1981);
Honigman  v. Green Giant Co.,  309  F.2d 667  (8th Cir.  1962),  cert. denied, 372 U.S. 941  (1963);
Zahn v. Transamerica  Corp.,  162 F.2d  36 (3d  Cir. 1947).CALIFORNIA  LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1072
proper distribution  of assets or sharing of new  participations  between
controlling  common  stockholders  and  the  remaining  common
stockholders.4
Appropriate solutions  for these problems turn on the validity and
meaning  of two  propositions  which, in general  terms, are part  of the
received learning about publicly held corporations.  First, all shares of
a particular class  (e.g.,  common stock) are to be treated  as homogene-
ous claims on enterprise wealth.  Each share represents the same claim
on  corporate  assets,  including  expected  returns,  as  each  other  share.
Therefore in any distribution of assets or alteration of participations in
the enterprise  each shareholder  should receive equal  amounts or par-
ticipate  equally per share  with each  other investor.  Second,  it is  the
duty of management  (and of majority stockholders in instructing man-
agement or voting on management's decisions) to make decisions with
respect to use of corporate assets or finance which are designed to max-
imize  enterprise  value  consistently with  the  investment  contract  and
with externally imposed legal constraints.
Conflict between the pressures to maximize enterprise value and to
accord  equal treatment  to  investors  is reconciled  in part through  the
investment contract.5  The question is to what extent, in the absence of
4.  Controlling  stockholders, like managers, presumably  act like economic agents seeking to
maximize the return to themselves-even at the expense of other stockholders.  Controlling stock-
holders may be management or they may simply install  a management  which does their bidding
or what it believes to be appropriate  to serve the controllers'  special interests.  In either case, the
temptation to divert common assets to the controllers at the expense of the other stockholders  is
the inevitable concomitant  of "control."  Most transactions  require the intitiative, or at least  the
approval, of management and directors.  It is assumed here, for ease of discussion, that manage-
ment and directors serve the special interests of articulate controllers, whether or not the control-
lers are the persons who constitute management  or the directors.
It is to be noted, however, that management  and directors  in authorizing  use of corporate
assets or directing corporate transactions are said to owe their obligations to the corporation, and
not, at least at the expense of the corporation, to particular stockholders, or to one group of stock-
holders rather than another.  See Delano v. Kitch, 663 F.2d 990,  998 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 946 (1981);  H. BALLANTINE,  CORPORATIONS  §§  43, 72a (2d ed.  1946); W. CARt  & M. EISEN-
BERG,  CASES  AND  MATERIALS  ON  CORPORATIONS  150-53 (5th ed.  1980); H. HENN,  LAW OF  COR-
PORATIONS  §§ 232,  235,  240  (2d  ed.  1970);  R.  STEVENS,  CORPORATIONS  § 143  (2d  ed.  1949);
Knauss, Corporate  Governance-A Moving Target, 79  MICH.  L.  REV.  478, 487-88  (1981).  As  a
consequence, in litigation challenging particular transactioxis  as favoring controlling stockholders,
the legal questions  are generally addressed to whether  the asserted managerial behavior improp-
erly diminishes, or fails to enhance, corporate wealth while conferring a collateral or added benefit
on controlling stockholders.  See, e.g.,  Complaint, Harman v. Masoneilan  Int'l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487,
490 (Del.  1982)  (No.  207,  1980).  See infra note  179.  To recognize management's  or  directors'
obligations to the corporation does not deny their fiduciary obligations  to individual shareholders
in personal  dealings between management,  them, and the shareholders.  See N. LATrIN,  CORPO-
RATIONS  §  81  (2d ed.  1971).
5.  The corporate capital structure, for example, may accommodate the pressure for equality
and the pressure to maximize enterprise value by allocating different risks and returns to different
securities.  Holders  of senior securities sacrifice equality of return for safety;  holders of common
stock sacrifice safety for the possibility of greater gain and the opportunity to maximize enterprise
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explicit  consent  to  unequal treatment  in  the investment  contract, the
law should respond to the claim for maximization of enterprise value at
the cost of equality among common stockholders  of publicly held cor-
porations.  That question6 and the import and validity of the two un-
derlying  propositions  will  be  examined  in  the  contexts  in  which
distributions and rearrangements  of participations most frequently oc-
cur:  (1) transactions which involve principally internal rearrangements
among  existing  participants  such  as dividend  or  liquidation  distribu-
tions, going private transactions, parent-subsidiary  mergers or stock re-
purchase  programs;  and  (2)  transactions  requiring  participation  by
third parties, such as  arm's-length mergers, two-step mergers,  or sales
of control.7
In  addressing  these  questions,  two  other  inquiries  are  also  in-
volved. The first is whether substantively equal treatment-i.e.,  distrib-
uting  assets  or new  participations  of equal  value-requires  formally
identical treatment.  If such treatment is required, it is presumably  re-
quired only instrumentally-as  a necessary,  or perhaps the most effec-
tive,  way  of assuring  substantive  equality.  To  characterize  formally
identical  treatment  as  "instrumental"  is  not to  deny  its  importance,
however.  Indeed,  the link between  formally  identical  treatment  and
substantively  equal treatment is so close that some who urge disparate
formal  treatment  seek  expressly  to  justify  substantive  inequality.s
Others tend to scant the substantive equality problem and focus on the
"excessive"  cost of a rule of formally  identical treatment.9  To reject
such a  rule, however,  imposes  other costs  on achieving  equality:  the
costs of monitoring self-dealing  transactions on a case-by-case basis to
value.  But when  the conflict between  equality  and maximization  pits one  set of common stock-
holders  against  the others, the investment contract  does not expressly stake out the limits of the
claim  for maximization.
6.  The question  whether to impute investor consent  ex ante to a majority  decision which
ultimately  treats members of the class unequally (to the advantage of the majority and disadvan-
tage of the minority)  raises different  issues  than  does  the question whether  to impute investor
consent to a majority decision to yield the entitlements of each member of the class in the interest
of interclass  settlement.  See, e.g.,  Aladdin Hotel  Co. v. Bloom,  200 F.2d  627 (8th Cir.  1953);
Goldman v. Postal TeL, Inc.,  52 F. Supp. 763  (D. Del.  1943); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,  1st
Sess. 221-24 (1977)  (interclass yielding  in the context of the new Bankruptcy  Act); Brudney, Pre-
ferred Stock Mod~fcations, supra note 4, at 447-48.
7.  Although it is  largely theoretical,  the question of equal treatment  of stockholders may
arise in the context of managerial control in the absence of dominant stockholders.  The issues in
that context involve managements  duties in the face of conflicting stockholder preferences, rather
than the issues of overreaching or misappropriation by one group of stockholders at the expense of
others.  See infra text accompanying  notes 167-72.
8.  See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate  Control Transactions,  91  YALE L.J.  698 (1982).
9.  See, e.g.,  Hetherington,  When the Sleeper Wakes:  Reflections on Corporate  Governance
and Shareholder  Rights, 8 HOFSTRA  L. REv.  183, 233-54  (1980); Wolfson,.A  Critique of Corporate
Law, 34  U. MIAMI L. REv.  959, 985-86  (1980).
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determine substantive equality in the absence of reliable market prices,
and of litigating  to enforce such equality.
The problem of equal treatment also implicates  the consequences
of corporate  decisions that enhance the personal wealth of some stock-
holders by way  of tax benefits  or other personal  preferences  without
adding to  corporate wealth.' 0  Formally  identical  treatment  of share-
holders may accompany  a use of corporate  assets that favors the per-
sonal wealth of controllers  at the actual,  or perhaps potential expense
of the noncontrollers,  or possibly at no cost to them."  If the collateral,
but real, impact of the corporate action adds to some shareholders'  per-
sonal wealth but not equivalently to corporate assets or to the personal
wealth  of other  stockholders, what  relief, if any  does a rule of equal
treatment require?
I
TRANSACTIONS  INVOLVING  DISTRIBUTIONS  OR  ONLY
INTERNAL  REARRANGEMENTS  OF  PARTICIPANTS
A.  Dividend Distributions
The  governing  law  requires  substantively  and  formally  equal
treatment  of shareholders  in dividend  distributions.  When  dividends
are paid to members of a single class of shareholders, each shareholder
must receive an amount equivalent to that paid to the other members
of the class.  The corporation statutes of most jurisdictions are not ex-
10.  The "value" of an aliquot portion of the enterprise represented by a share of its common
stock may be said to depend not only upon the value of the enterprise, but also upon the personal
tax positions, portfolios, or other economic requirements  of the  individual investors involved.  If
each investor were concerned only with the sum of the distributions he receives and the remaining
value  of his share  of the  enterprise  there would  be little  reason  for  considering  the  impact  of
different managerial  decisions  on different  stockholders.  But each investor  takes additional  fac-
tors into account.  He assesses the impact of the form which the distribution takes or the increased
value  of the security  he receives  on his total wealth,  in the light of his individual  tax position,
portfolio,  or other personal  preference.
Thus, a dividend payment may be made or  withheld at  the cost of an increase  in corporate
wealth, but it may favor particular stockholders whose personal income tax position is advantaged
by the corporate decision.  On another level,  a sale of assets or merger may be recommended  by
management or forced by majority stockholders at a price in shares of one buyer which is less than
another potential buyer is willing to pay in cash--to  the tax and economic benefit of some  stock-
holders and  at the cost of others.
11.  The problems  that  arise  in relating  majority decisions about  common  property  to the
individual  preferences of the  constituents sharing claims on the common  property have been the
subject  of considerable  inquiry.  K. ARROW,  SOCIAL CHOICE  AND  INDIVIDUAL  VALUES  (2d ed,
1963); J. BUCHANAN  & G. TULLOCK,  THE  CALCULUS  OF  CONSENT:  LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS  OF
CONSTITUTIONAL  DEMOCRACY  ch.  6  (1962);  M.  OLSEN,  THE  Loolc  OF  COLLECTIv  E  ACTION
(1977).  However intractable these problems are in the context of the governance of society-with
its manifold  goals-they become more manageable as the range of possible goals is narrowed.  In
corporate decisions,  at least if the single goal is  maximizing the value  of collective  assets, closer
meshing of individual  preferences and collective  choices becomes feasible.
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plicit  on the subject,  and corporate charters do not generally  spell out
the  matter  in  detail.'2  But, the  case  law  leaves  little  doubt  that, al-
though members of the class may  be given  a choice,  none may be  re-
quired to accept payment different in form or amount than is offered to
the  others.'
3
As a general proposition, a rule that assures substantive equality of
dividend payments  offers common  stock investors  a higher return per
unit of risk, and society a less costly vehicle for obtaining capital, than
a  rule  that permits indeterminately  differential  payments  of common
stock  dividends.  It also  can  reasonably  be  said to  conform to  public
investors'  expectations.  Without a prescribed arrangement for equality
of dividends the potential minority or disfavored investor would have
no control over when management or a majority could, and no sense of
when it would, allot more per share to some stockholders than it allows
12.  Typical  statutes  simply provide that  the board of directors  may declare  and pay  divi-
dends  to  stockholders.  See, e.g.,  DEL.  CODE  ANN.  tit.  8,  § 170  (1975);  N.Y.  Bus.  CORP.  LAW
§  510(a) (McKinney 1963).  When legislatures wish to permit the parties to change the assumption
of equal treatment, as with preemptive rights, explicit language is used.  See DEL. CODE  ANN. tit.
8,  § 102(b)(3)  (1975).  Cf. MODEL  BusINESS  CORP.  ACT  § 33  (1979)  (comparable  treatment  of
voting rights per share).
Charter provisions  in form books sometimes provide explicitly for proration of dividends for
both common, K. PANTZER & F.H. O'NEAL,  THE DRAFTING  OF CORPORATE  CHARTERS  AND  BY-
LAws  116 (ALI Handbook  C 1951), and preferred, C. ISRAELs,  CORPORATE  PRACTICE 391 (1963);
C.  ISRAELS  & R.  GORMAN,  CORPORATE  PRACTICE  107  (1962),  stock.
Corporate  charters  may  possibly  permit  distinctions within  a class.  See, e.g.,  DEL.  CODE
ANN.  tit.  8, §  170  (1975).  Cf. Providence  & Worcester Co.  v. Baker, 378 A.2d  121  (Del.  1977)  (a
charter provision which provides for different voting rights within a class is valid).  But unless the
charter permits directors to exercise  their discretion  in allocating participations  to  some unspeci-
fied  members of the class but not to others,  no  serious issue  is raised; the act of contracting  ex-
pressly  for a distinction  that  does  not give  directors  discretion  with  respect  to  distributions to
individual  shareholders  may  appropriately be deemed  to create two  separate classes of stock.
13.  See Twenty  Seven Trust v. Realty Growth  Investors,  533 F. Supp.  1028,  1040 (D. Md.
1982);  Redhead  v. Iowa Nat'l  Bank,  127  Iowa 572,  575-76,  103  N.W. 796,  798  (1905);  Godley v.
Crandall  & Godley  Co.,  153 A.D.  697, 707-09,  139  N.Y.S.  236,  244-45  (1912),  modifted on other
grounds, 212  N.Y.  121,  105  N.E. 818  (1914);  cf. State v.  Baltimore  &  O.R.R.,  6 Gill  363  (Md.
1847).  See generally  11  W. FLETCHER,  CYCLOPEDIA  OF  THE  LAW  OF  PRIVATE  CORPORATIONS
§ 5352, at 723-28  (1971).  But  Cf. Lewis v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 331 Mass. 670,  121 N.E.2d 850
(1954)  (allowing  redemption of a portion of common stock).
The requirement of equal  treatment  is not only  implicit in corporation  statutes,  but is also
embraced,  if not required,  by fiduciary  principles.  To  be sure, the majority's  power to use  the
assets  of all  the  investors  was  not delegated  to it  by  the investors  as to an  officer  or director.
Indeed, the emergence of a coherent majority may be entirely unexpected  by investors.  Moreover
the majority is itself a substantial owner of the common  property.  Hence, the  risks the  majority
takes in operating or selling those assets affect it more than they might a trustee, an executive or an
agent.  And its right to participate in decisionmaking in those matters is not less than that of other
investors.  But  because the  size  of its  holdings  gives it  effective  power  in decisionmaking  with
respect  to others' assets, some restrictions on its power, by analogy  to those restricting a trustee or
agent, are  appropriate.  Those restraints  need not be  as rigorously  categorical  as  in the case  of
trustees  or agents.  See  Anderson, supra note  1, at 790.  The question  is  to what extent  those
restrictions should prohibit controllers from unilaterally appropriating a disproportionate share of
the assets, where  the value of the assets may be enhanced  by the controller's  policies.
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to a minority.  In the absence of some contractually or legally imposed
minimum allocation to each stockholder, the entire enterprise could be
diverted to the others.
Such a level of risk would be, if not intolerable, at least very costly.
It would be more costly than it would be worth unless it were necessary
to assure  some expected  gain to society  and were  accompanied  by  an
increment  to  the  potential  minority.  It is  difficult  to  envision  either
consequence  resulting from a rule allowing discretionary  allocation  of
dividends.t4  Given the present state  of our knowledge,  the higher re-
turn per unit of risk required to induce investment in such a regime is a
cost  which  appears  to  outweigh  any  compensating  gain  for  society.
This conclusion  is  supported, if not demonstrated,  by the  probability
that issuers and underwriters offering securities  would prefer  a rule of
equal treatment in dividend  payments to a rule of discretionary  treat-
ment that would require explicit description to investors of the risks of
disparate treatment. 5
If the governing  principle requires  that dividend  distributions  be
substantively  equal there is rarely  reason to  tolerate  any difference  in
the form of the dividends distributed.  To allow one group  to be given
cash and another group property (e.g.,  stock in the portfolio of the dis-
tributing company, a building,  or some other item not  in the  form  of
cash)  creates  the possibility,  if not the probability, of substantive  ine-
quality.  Prudence, if not principle,  counsels forbidding  such formally
different  treatment.  The  temptation  to  differentiate  substantively  in
favor of the majority is obvious.  To allow such formal disparity would
impose on minority  recipients the cost of ascertaining whether the dis-
tribution concealed  a  substantive  disparity,  and the cost  of enforcing
the equal division of any gains realized by the majority.
B.  Liquidating  Distributions  and Going Private
A  different  question  is presented  if an  increase  in  the aggregate
amount distributable  to, or in the aggregate wealth  of, all stockholders
depends  upon a decision which will only be made by the majority if it
14.  Disparate dividend  payouts  are not needed to  encourage  investors to monitor  manage-
ment.  Cf  text accompanying  note  146.
15.  Cf. N.  BUCHANAN,  THE ECONOMICS  OF  CORPORATE  ENTERPRISE  455-59  (1940)  (full
disclosure may have a deterrent effect on investment).  In theory, legal arrangements  could  permit
management or majorities to make discretionary disparate dividend distributions unless  investors
contracted expressly  against such distributions,  or for minimum  payments.  But as experience-
particularly with preferred stock  and with antidilution  clauses  in convertibles-suggests, see, e.g,.
Katzin, Financial  and  Legal Problems  in the Use of  Convertible Securities, 24 Bus. LAW.  359, 360-
66 (1969);  Brudney, Preferred  Stock Modfcations, supra note 4; W. CARY & M.  EISENBERO, supra
note 3, at 1144-62, it is impossible to contract against all contingencies  and costly to try.  Not only
would such a contract be difficult to draft (as are antidilution  clauses), but it would expose  inves-
tors to risks  in operation  (as preferred stockholders'  experience  shows).
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receives  more than its pro rata share of the increase in wealth.  As a
practical matter, that question  is unlikely to be presented by any more
or less regular distribution of dividends during the continued operation
of the firm.  But,  it can arise, and present  substantially more complex
problems of equality of treatment when a controlling group of individ-
uals  or a privately  held parent  corporation:  (1) distributes  the firm's
assets on dissolution; or  (2) initiates going private  transactions. 1 6
In the former case, the problem arises if the control group distrib-
utes the corporation's  real assets (generally as a going concern) to itself
and an assertedly  equivalent amount of cash per share to the minority
public investors-either by dissolution or by merger with a dummy.  In
the latter case, the  control group may cause the issuer to purchase  its
own stock by public tender offer and/or to merge the public investors
out of the enterprise  by forming a dummy corporation  to which the
issuer's real assets are distributed and cash  is paid to the public stock-
holders.  In each case, some gains are asserted for the transaction, both
to society and to minority investors.  To determine whether to sacrifice
the  rule  of equal  treatment  for  those  gains  implicates  the  questions
whether those gains are significant and depend upon a rule of unequal
treatment,  whether  the  costs  of a rule  of unequal  treatment  exceed
those gains, and whether, in any event, considerations of fairness per-
mit a rule of unequal treatment.
L  Liquidating  Distributions
a.  Entitlement to Equal Treatment
There  is  no doubt  that both statutes  and case  law require  equal
amounts  or values  to be distributed per share to members of a single
class  upon  dissolution  of the  enterprise. 7  And  while  the  matter  is
16.  It is possible, although improbable, for such disparate liquidating distributions or going
private to be initiated by management in the absence of controlling stockholders.  It is difficult to
envision  circumstances  in which such  transactions  are  likely to  occur which offer  grounds for
making disparate distributions any more tolerable when initiated by management than when initi-
ated by  controlling stockholders.
17.  Statutes occasionally require "ratable"  payment of preferred shares in liquidation.  See,
e.g.,  N.Y.  Bus.  CORP. LAW  § 502(b)  (McKinney  1963).  The cases  are somewhat  more explicit.
Kellogg  v. Georgia-Pacific Paper Corp., 227 F. Supp. 719,  722 (W.D. Ark.  1964); Zimmerman v.
Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 61 Cal. App. 2d 585,  143 P.2d 409  (1943); In re San Joaquin  Light
& Power Corp., 52 Cal. App. 2d 814,  127  P.2d 29 (1942); cf.  Lebold v. Inland Steel Co.,  125 F.2d
369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,  316 U.S. 675  (1942), appealfollowing  remand, 136 F.2d 876 (1943).
See  Borden, Going Privale-Old  Tort, New Tort or No  Tort?; 49  N.Y.U.  L. REv.  987,  990-93
(1974).  And form books plainly contemplate  that charters will provide for equal payments "per
share."  See C. IsRAELs, supra note 12, at 393; K. PANTZER & F.H. O'NEAL, supra  note  12, at  116;
G. SEWARD,  BASIC  CORPORATE  PRACTICE  93 (ALI-ABA  1962).
The fact that statutes and investment contracts provide for amendment of contracts by major-
ity  vote does not preclude  a rule of equal treatment.  If such amendment provisions,  whether in
statutes  or contracts,  were construed  to permit the majority to alter the equality terms for  their
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largely academic  and the cases  ambiguous,"8  there  is good  reason  to
require formally identical as well  as substantively  equivalent distribu-
tions.  The  conclusion-both  with  respect  to  distribution  of  equal
amounts  and with respect to identical formal treatment-may  best be
illustrated by examining various distributions which might be made by
an enterprise with 100,000 shares of common stock outstanding, selling
at $20 per share and, all other things being equal, expected to continue
so to sell.
i  Distributions  which produce  losses  for minority shareholders. In
the simplest scenario, the controller, an individual  or group of private
individuals, owns 50,000 shares, and causes the corporation to liquidate
and dissolve.  He distributes $16  per share to each minority stockholder
while he takes $24 per share for himself.  Since the dissolution has not
resulted in any increment in value of the enterprise,  there is no more
reason to tolerate any such disparity in the liquidation distribution than
in the case of ordinary continuing dividends.19
Should the result be any different if the enterprise value increases
(becomes  worth  more  than  its going  concern  value of $2,000,000)  in
circumstances that require, or induce the controller to desire, its disso-
lution?  For example, suppose the enterprise  owns a building without
which it can function only at a considerably less profitable level than in
the past.  The controller discovers  a use for the building which  entails
added risk acceptable  to all investors,  but makes  it worth  $2,500,000
and requires abandoning the business.  Or suppose the firm's manage-
own benefit,  there would  be  no limit  to the  minority's  exposure  to expropriation.  A different
problem is raised  by the  holdup powers of one  class of stock to force  another class  to yield by
amendment in a distribution of assets. See, e.g.,  Goldman v. Postal Tel., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763 (D.
Del. 1943).  In that circumstance the consent of a majority (or more) of the victims to the holdup is
required.  See, e.g.,  MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT §§ 59-60 (1979).  Amendment  by a majority of a
class for its own benefit does not offer victims even the protection of requiring their own consent.
18.  See, e.g.,  Kellogg  v. Georgia-Pacific  Paper  Corp., 227  F.  Supp. 719,  722 (W.D.  Ark.
1964); Zimmerman  v. Tide Water Associated Oil  Co.,  61 Cal. App. 2d  585,  143  P.2d 409  (1943).
19.  Rational investors would not consent to disparate sharing that might give them even less
than they had before dissolution even if there were reason to believe that such a disparate distribu-
tion would induce controllers to increase the size of the distributable pie.  The minority investors
would likely be losers on every occasion  and never share in  any of the value  made  possible  by
their consent to disproportionate sharing. In such a hypothetical ex ante bargaining position, even
if we  assume that it is unknown who is, or may become, the controlling investor, and that there-
fore a rational investor would balance his possible losses with the possibility that he might share in
the mulcting upon dissolution, the rational  risk-averse investor will not choose a rule of disparate
sharing.  He will  be affected  by the uncertainty  of whether he will become  part  of the  control
group and the uncertainty of the amount that the control  group might appropriate  from  the mi-
nority.  More important, with no requirement that the eventual controller condition dissolution on
increasing distributable values, and no reason to believe he will only effect disparate distributions
when values are increased by, or as a part of, the dissolution, a rule permitting such distributions
would be wasteful.  It would increase  risk without increasing  gain.  In short, social gain  will not
result  from, and advance consent will not rationally be given to, such behavior.
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ment  generates  a  readily  implementable  proposal  for  an  additional
product  which  is expected  to  produce  a return  (albeit  at added  risk)
that will make the business worth $2,500,000, net of the cost (which the
firm  is able to meet) of implementing the proposal.20  Should the law
permit the  majority shareholders  to dissolve  the corporation and  dis-
tribute the business to themselves  (at $34 per share) and cash (at $16
per share) to the minority-i.e. to condition corporate acceptance of the
proposal upon liquidating disproportionately?  It is hard to see why the
fact that a higher value will accompany the transaction should enable
the controller to condition  the firm's  realization of that increase  on  a
diversion to himself that results in the minority receiving less than its
predistribution value.
Disproportionate  division  in  the  liquidation  context  would  in-
crease the cost of capital no less than would disparate  distribution of
dividends.  An investor investing in an enterprise which has a control-
ling stockholder  group would understand that he would be subject to
the risk of virtually complete  expropriation  by the controller.2  If he
were to invest in an enterprise with widely dispersed stockholdings and
no controlling  stockholders, he would be exposed to the risk of some-
one  acquiring  control,22  or of managerial  arbitrariness.  And  since
shares are freely transferable  in a national market, the investor would
have no way of knowing whether he would be, or would be permitted
to be, a participant in the majority or favored group.'  Faced with such
uncertainty,  the investor would raise his price for investing.
Moreover in theory, at least, it is not necessary to permit so une-
qual a  division of the gains in order to induce the controller to move
the assets to a presumably  better use.  If he captured all the gain from
20.  The hypothetical proposal does not require capital unavailable to the firm, and it offers a
"fit"  with the  firm's  present  business,  so  that  the  conventional  "corporate  opportunity"  issues
raised by the proposal are minimal.
21.  Statutory restrictions on payment of dividends (whether by reference to earned surplus,
balance  sheet or other tests) offer some protection  for common  stockholders prior to dissolution;
but even  that protection is notoriously porous  and not available on dissolution.
22.  To the extent that federal and state legislation narrow the possibility of acquiring control
to the tender  offer, the consequence  of that risk is mitigated  by the potential controller's  need to
offer potential minority stockholders  a price.  But  the bidder's price will reflect the fact that the
target's stock is presumably selling at a price embodying the risk of being expropriated.
23.  In theory, investors can reduce the risk of investing in a particular corporation by diver-
sifying their portfolios.  See Modigliani & Pogue, An Introduction  to  Risk and Returrn  Concepts
and  Evidence (pts.  1 & 2), FIN.  ANALYSTS  J.,  Mar.-Apr.  1974, at 68,  May-June  1974, at 69.  But
such diversification  is not available for the risks to minority investors in corporations which are
controlled privately.  Public investors cannot invest in other privately controlled  corporations and
hence cannot become the beneficiaries of diversion by other private controllers.  To be sure, inves-
tors may invest in stocks of publicly held parent corporations and thus become beneficiaries of any
disparate distribution  the parents cause the subsidiaries  to make  to the parents.  But that would
require investors to add still another variable  to their risk-return  calculations.  See infra text ac-
companying notes 82-83.
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the "better"  use of corporate assets,24  he should not need or rationally
be entitled to the added  inducement of expropriating  some of the mi-
nority's share of predissolution  value.
ii  Distributions which apparently leave minority shareholders no
worse off.  Should the principle of equality be abandoned if the minor-
ity is offered the protection of a requirement  that the majority give the
minority, on dissolution, not less than its proportionate interest in the
predissolution value of the enterprise?  For example, should the major-
ity be permitted, if it approves the proposal to make the corporate  as-
sets worth $2,500,000, to distribute $1,050,000  to the minority and keep
$1,450,000  for itself?  Or should the principle  of equality  protect the
minority and preclude the majority from taking more than its propor-
tionate share?
The argument for departure from a rule of equal treatment is that,
ex ante, rational  minority investors  should consent  to  such  departure
because they will be better off under a regime that  offers them a share
(however modest) in the gains;  and that society  will  be better  off be-
cause the assets will be put to a more productive use, at least if produc-
tivity is  tested by their increased  dollar value.  But there is reason to
believe  (a) that the realization of those gains  does not, except perhaps
to  a  marginal  extent,  require  a rule  of disparate  treatment;  (b)  that
those gains are outweighed by the costs of even so limited a version of a
rule of unequal treatment, and (c) that considerations of fairness argue
sufficiently powerfully  for  a rule of equal treatment  to overcome  the
uncertain, if any, excess  of gain over cost from the contrary  rule.
(a)
A disproportionate  division is only justified if any gain, or better
social use to be made of the assets, depends functionally on the control-
ler receiving  a  disproportionate  share.  If the controller's  claim to the
"sweetener"  rests merely upon his power to extort a toll for his consent
to the project rather than upon a legitimate claim for compensation due
to added risk or added effort in discovering or making the new  use of
the property, there is little reason to honor the claim.  The risk attend-
ing the conversion  of the building or the new proposal  for the use  of
corporate  assets will be borne by all stockholders pro rata, not particu-
larly by the controller.  Hence, the controller, in accepting the proposal
24.  He may  claim that the value of his control block is more than  his aliquot share of the
enterprise value, either because it enables him to appropriate  assets or perquisites improperly or
because he can claim a premium on sale of control.  Neither is an appropriate reason for allowing
unequal sharing on liquidation, see infra note 160, and certainly  not if such sharing  deprives the
minority of the preliquidation value  of their shares.
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or converting the building,  does not take on any unshared  risk which
requires  extra compensation,  much  less the  open-ended kind of com-
pensation which is contemplated by a rule of disproportionate  sharing
on a "no  worse off" basis.
The gain resulting from the new use may be dependent upon the
controlling  stockholder  sharing in it disproportionately if he imposes
such  sharing as  a condition to his lending his efforts  (as distinguished
from risking his capital) to seeking or managing the new use.  Entitle-
ment  to  compensation  for  expenditure  of his  efforts  does  not equate
with disproportionate  sharing in gains.  In any given case it is hard to
determine  the value  of the controller's talents  and efforts,  or whether
their expenditure  is necessary  to the discovery  or  successful  exploita-
tion of the new use,  or whether he  is simply  attempting to  assert his
holdup power.  But even if it is legitimately possible to tie the expected
gain to the controller's effort and his resulting insistence upon unequal
treatment, the question is whether that potential for gain is worth the
cost of permitting it.
In  seeking  to answer  the question of how large a gain to society
will be lost by a rule that discourages  a controller from seeking or per-
mitting improved uses  of property from which he does not receive all,
or the lion's share, of the gain, no very precise  quantifications  can be
expected.  Not only  are there  no  adequate  markets  to calibrate  such
exchange decisions, but the variations in the amounts for which differ-
ent controllers  will "settle"  leave the problem unanswerable  except in
terms  of direction.25  Some gains  will not be  realized, but the magni-
tude of the resulting  social cost is ambiguous.
(b)
For the minority investors to be "better off" under a rule of dispa-•
rate treatment, they must receive  something of more value on dissolu-
tion than they had prior to dissolution.  If investors are uncertain  as to
whether they are receiving more than they owned prior to liquidation,
it would require  significant social  gains to justify such disparate  treat-
25.  If stockholders were offered the ex ante choice between a rule of  equal sharing and a rule
of disparate treatment, on a "no worse off"  basis, they would not be without a reasonable basis for
choosing  the former.  The controller will not turn down all gains or decline to seek them under a
rule of equal treatment, particularly  if he is  paid the cost of his effort.  See infra note 45.  To be
sure, there is some marginal level of gain at which the controller would not undertake the new use
if equal sharing were required---the  level at which the new use  produces less than the value  of
being able to exploit control both on a continuing basis and by sale at a premium.  To the extent
that the latter is forbidden and the former is more carefully policed, the level of gain at which the
controller would balk is reduced.  See infra note 160.  To the extent that transactions involve that
level  of gain or less, minority stockholders  and society may lose by  a rule of equal choice.
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ment since, ex ante, knowledge of that uncertainty would raise the cost
of investing.
The amount by which shareholders  are claimed to be "better off"
is generally said to be the difference between the cash they receive  on
dissolution  and the predissolution  value,  as  evidenced  by the market
price of their stock.26  But that price  does not automatically  establish
the value of the minority's interest.  Nor does it automatically establish
the equivalence  of the cash  distributed  to the public and the value of
the business retained by the controllers.
The mere fact of majority  control throws  a considerable  shadow
on the  validity  of the  predissolution  market  price  of the  minority's
stock as a measure of its value.  That shadow is not incompatible with
most acceptable  concepts  of an  efficient market.  The  claims  for the
efficient market may or may not, in general, be sufficiently established
to  underpin  norms  predicated  on  the  "correctness"  of stock  market
prices.27  The best established of those claims is predicated  on the be-
havior of listed stocks or stocks of comparably sized firms;  and in any
event, it is rarely claimed that at all times all stock prices (even of listed
stocks)  reflect  all relevant  or  material information  about  value.  It is
conceded that prices do not always  reflect all "inside"  information.28
26.  Easterbrook  &  Fischel, supra note 8,  at 714-15.  There  is, of course,  no certainty that
even as so measured the minority will be given much "more."  Controllers, acting unilaterally, are
not likely to give the minority any more than the prevailing rule would require--enough  to leave
the minority slightly, but uncertainly, better off.
27.  The claims  for "efficiency"  of the stock market are uncertain in scope and are not un-
challenged in principle or empirically.  See L. SUMMERS,  Do  WE  REALLY  KNOW THAT  FINAN-
CIAL  MARKETS  ARE  EFFICIENT?  (Nat'l  Bur. of Econ.  Research  Working  Paper  No.  994, Sept.
1982); Foster, Briloff  and  the Capital  Markets, 17 J. AccT. RESEARCH  262, 268-69 (1979):  authori-
ties cited in Brudney,  Efficient Markets  and Fair  Values in Parent  Subsidiary  Mergers,  4 J. CORP.  L.
63, 66 n.14 (1978).  See also Lowenstein, Pruning  Deadwood  in Hostile Takeovers.- A Proposalfor
Legislation, 83  COLUM.  L. REv. 249 (1983), for a discussion of the possibility of simple undervalu-
ation by the securities markets and of possible differences in "efficiency"  between the market for
shares and the market for firms.  The concept of efficient  markets covers transactions  on average.
Any given transaction or set of transactions may depart radically from the average.  Such a depar-
ture is most probable in the case of transactions by controllers involving the stocks of their corpo-
rations when  they contemplate going private, merging with subsidiaries, or repurchasing  shares.
See Brudney, supra, at 69-73; see also V.  BRUDNEY  & M.  CHIRELSTEIN,  CASES  AND  MATERIALS
ON  CORPORATE  FINANCE  964-67  (2d  ed.  1979).  Other  imperfections,  which  are  impervious  to
diversification,  also afflict the capital markets.  See, e.g.,  C. HALEY & L. SCHALL,  THE THEORY O
FINANCIAL  DECISIONS  ch.  14 (2d ed.  1979); Modigliani & Cohn, Inflation, Valuation and  the Mar-
ket,  FIN. ANALYsT's  J., Mar.-Apr.  1979,  at  24; Kahn, The Tyranny ofSmall Decisions: Market
Failures,  Imper/ections, and the Limits ofEconomics, 19  KYKLOs  23  (1966); see also Arrow, Risk
Perception  in Psychology and  Economics, ECON.  INQUIRY,  Jan.  1982,  at  1-8.
28.  See Fama,  Efficient Capital  Markets: A  Review ofTheory and  Empirical  Work, 25 J. FIN.
383, 415-16  (1970); J. LORIE & M.  HAMILTON,  THE STOCK  MARKET:  THEORIES AND  EvIDENCE
96  (1973).  It has been suggested that the law of fraud,  federal disclosure  requirements,  and  the
efforts of private seekers of information  are able to assure investors  adequate disclosure of such
information  so that  price  will  reflect full value  at  the time  of a liquidation  by  a controller,  a
parent-subsidiary  merger, or a going private transaction, c/.  Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8,
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That concession is significant in a context in which market price is,
to a greater or lesser extent, within the control of the controlling stock-
holders,  and therefore its  "correctness"  poses  a continuing  risk to the
minority.  That potential risk is accentuated  because  the majority has
unrestricted  control  of the  timing  of the  dissolution  and  associated
transactions.  Even in efficient  markets, and without insiders'  expecta-
tions  of increase  in enterprise value,  stock  prices can be temporarily
manipulated  in anticipation of dissolution.2 9  While  federal and  state
disclosure  requirements have  narrowed the range for such manipula-
tion, the minority is  nevertheless put at an indeterminate,  but not in-
considerable,  risk that the measure  of its entitlement  under a rule  of
"no worse treatment"  (i.e.,  market price) is disadvantageously  flexible
at the wish of the majority.  And the uncertainty as to the value of the
enterprise distributable  on dissolution30  enlarges that flexibility.
In view of these uncertainties, a rule of disparate treatment would
render  the  investor  powerless  to  prevent  a  division  of assets  which
leaves  him either worse  off than he was before  dissolution  (albeit in
receipt of a price higher than the apparently "correct"  market price), or
at 730-31  (arguing that banning going private transactions is not justified by the risk of exploita-
tion of inside information);  Hetherington, supra note 9, at 235  (arguing that disclosure  require-
ments and  appraisal rights can lead to a valuation of shares  that is reasonable  and protects the
public).  But the proposition  is not self-evident.  Indeed,  it is hard to find evidence  to support it.
There have been suggestions that issuer tender offers  (which may or may not involve controlling
stockholders  or implicate  going private transactions)  benefit  offerees  more than nonsellers,  but
that open-market purchases by issuers benefit nonsellers  more than offerees.  The evidence  is am-
biguous so  far as going private transactions  are concerned.  And the short  time spans  involved
in the studies leave open the question whether unrevealed prospects surface later. See M. Bradley
&  K. Wakeman, The  Wealth  Effects  of Targeted  Share  Repurchases  (Sept.  1982)  (unpublished
manuscript  forthcoming  in volume  11  of the Journal of  Financial  Economics); Dann, Common
Stock Repurchases.: An Analysis of  Returns to Bondholders  and  Stockholders, 9 J. FIN.  ECON.  113
(1981);  Masulis, Stock Repurchase by Tender Offer: An Analysis of the Causes of Common Stock
Price Changes, 35 J. FIN. 305  (1980);  Vermaelen,  Common Stock Repurchases  and  Market Signal-
ling: An Empirical  Study, 9 J.  FIN.  ECON.  139  (1981).
In any event, the suggestion that the law of fraud does or can compel adequate disclosure in
such cases  comes with a certain disingenuousness from those whose passion is to narrow the dis-
closure  required by  the federal securities  laws, apparently in the dispassionate  interest of saving
costs and increasing efficiency.  See, eg.,  Hetherington, supra note 9, at 247.
29.  See Brudney, supra note 27, at 69-73; Penman, Insider Trading and  the Dissemination  of
Firms' Forecast  Information, 55 J. Bus. 479  (1982).
30.  The indeterminate  value of the  share of the assets  (i.e.,  the  going business) which the
controller elects to keep is evidenced in the courts' efforts to value businesses which have a flawed
stock-market value.  Difficulties of valuation and uncertainties  of estimates are suggested by opin-
ions  in  appraisal proceedings  in  the Delaware  courts.  See  Note, The Dissenting Shareholder's
Appraisal Remedy,  30  OKLA.  L.  Rav. 629,  640-41  (1977);  Note,  Valuation of Dissenters' Stock
Under  Appraisal  Statutes, 79 HARV.  L. REv.  1453,  1468-69  (1966).  Those difficulties are not less-
ened by the valuation prescription in Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del.  1983).  See also
Brudney, supra note 27,  at 76.
Since ascertaining the value of the going concern  thus distributable to the majority requires
eliciting  information which  the controller  has about the  future,  quantifying  the  distribution is
particularly difficult and  costly for the outside minority.C-LIFORNIA  LW REVIEW
subject  to a disproportionate  division" of values  whose  magnitude  he
cannot  determine.  No  principle would  enable  a rational  investor  to
predict in advance to how much of a diversion by the controller (120%,
45%, 20%)  of the investor's aliquot share of the ultimate increase he is
consenting.  Nor  could  he  tell  in  advance  how  soon  this  diversion
would be visited upon him.  Both the risks of loss and the possibilities
of gain are likely, if not certain, to be shared disproportionately to the
investor's  disadvantage in magnitudes which have ambiguous limits on
the downside  and no assurance  on the upside.  Those limits are to  be
determined  by the greed or sense of propriety of the controllers.
In a perfect world,  investors  could  diversify  and thus  dilute  the
risk of being mulcted.  In such  a world, investors  could estimate  eco-
nomic risks  and returns, and fix a price for capital  that would equili-
brate with expected gains to themselves, if not to society.3'  But in the
imperfect  world  which  most  investors  inhabit,  they  cannot  diversity
away the risks of being mulcted by the controllers  on dissolution.32  A
rule setting predissolution  value and hence market price as a  floor on
their  recovery  promises  them  air.  It does  not  assure  them  any  gain
from such transactions.  And  it gives  controllers  the incentive  to dis-
tribute less than  aliquot shares even if measured  on a  predistribution
value basis.  Exposure to such risks would raise the cost of capital to an
indeterminate  extent.33
A rule of unequal treatment would also conduce  to waste.  It cre-
ates the possibility, by no means remote, that the controller's  concern
with the enterprise's value-and the market price of its stock-will  be
diluted  to the  extent that his share of any  distributable  value can  be
satisfactorily  increased.  To be sure,  the controller  will not purposely
conduct the firm's affairs so as to diminish its value.  But, if the control-
ler's pursuit of enterprise gain is mixed with concern  about how to as-
sure  a disparate  return  to himself, energy  which  in theory  should  be
spent only on the former is likely  to be diverted  in part to  the latter.
And the  temptation  to  engage  in control  transactions  which  permit
such  diversion contains the seeds of utterly wasteful  transaction  costs
which  are not offset by social  gains of any sort.
31.  However, social waste  is likely if the cost of capital must be determined  by discounting
for uncertainties  (the mulcting possibilities)  whose  variance  should  rationally  be greater,  or at
least more difficult to measure, than the variance of expected  economic returns from  the distrib-
uted  asset;  or if the required  return  for public investors includes  a component  not required  or
offset in the economic return expected by the acquirer of the distributed  asset.
32.  By definition, the risk of being dissolved by a private controller is nondiversifiable.  With
regard  to parent subsidiary  transactions,  the  problem of diversification  is discussed  at infra  text
accompanying  notes 81-84.
33.  To be sure, there are limits to feasible market manipulation.  Hence, with a more or less
finite estimate possible, it is open  to the investor,  ex ante,  to seek to factor  the consequences  of
potential manipulation into the cost of capital and to seek a higher return on his initial investment.
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In sum, the costs of a rule of unequal treatment are not small.  It is
difficult to envision the magnitude of gains to society which would be
necessary  to offset that cost.  It is even more difficult to  see that such
gains  depend  on  permitting  controllers  to  take  a  disproportionate
rather than an aliquot share of the gains.
(c)
Whether or not considerations of efficiency counsel a rule of equal
treatment,  considerations  of fairness  and  distributional  policy  argue
against a departure from that rule, at least where disparate treatment of
stockholders  is a function  of decisions by  a control  group to allocate
more than its pro rata  share of corporate  assets to itself.  There is evi-
dence, albeit not conclusive, to suggest that a rule of unequal treatment
will accentuate disparities  of return between higher income and lower
income investors  in stocks, if indeed it will not result in distributions
from the latter to the former.
3 4  In any event, in assessing the propriety
of a rule of unequal treatment, or whether investors in a for-profit ven-
ture "ought"  to consent  to  such  a rule, it is not necessary  to  import
considerations  of altruism,  or notions that underlie  a sense of unfair-
ness if benefits are not shared along with risks, or an ethic of "to each
according to his needs,"  however apposite they may be.  Nor in view of
investors'  legitimate expectations  of equal treatment is it necessary to
press broader moral arguments for equality.35
As an empirical matter, it is probable that investors in the common
stock of publicly held enterprises do not expect  that some members of
the class will receive more dividends or larger distributions on liquida-
tion  than  others.  Investors'  expectations  of  equal  treatment  legiti-
mately  derive  from  the  language  of the  investment  contract,  which
implies,  if it does not expressly  state, that if dividends  or liquidating
distributions are paid, they will be paid equally to all.36  Furthermore,
such  expectations  are  the  common  understanding  of the  investment
community.  Neither finance texts nor other relevant literature  suggest
any other order of affairs.  On the contrary, they plainly  contemplate
equality of treatment 7 .3   There do not appear to be any corporate char-
34.  It has been suggested that corporate stock owned by high income investors appreciates in
value substantially faster than stock owned by investors with lower incomes.  M. FELDSTEIN & S.
YITZHAK1,  ARE  HIGH INCOME  INDIVIDUALS  BETTER  STOCK MARKET INVESTORS?  (Harvard  Inst.
of Econ. Research  Discussion Paper No. 918,  Sept.  1982).  To the extent that frozen  out public
investors are likely to have lower incomes  and assets than controlling stockholders,  a rule of une-
qual treatment also has the effect of redistributing  assets systematically from the less affluent to the
more affluent.
35.  See, e.g.,  J. RAWLS,  A THEORY OF JUSTICE §§  13,  46 (1971).
36.  See supra note  12.
37.  Indeed, the standard valuation models in finance textbooks necessarily assume  homoge-
neous treatment of shares of  stock of a given class in making distributions.  See, e.g., J. WESTON &
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ters of publicly held enterprises which expressly provide for discretion-
ary disparate treatment of shareholders of the same class.  The contrast
between  the  absence  of such  provisions  and  the presence  of explicit
offers  to stockholders  of the option to accept  individual  variations in
particular  dividends,3"  or different  classes  of stock  carrying  different
dividend  privileges,  supports  the impression  that the normal  investor
expects equal treatment.
The failure of prospectuses  or other literature attending  the issu-
ance of corporate stock to negate the possiblity of disparate treatment
does not derive from any perceived belief that it is necessary to do so in
order to allay prevalent investor fears that homogeneous treatment  is
not their entitlement.  On the contrary, if such treatment were not seen
to  be  both their expectation  and their entitlement,  there  is no doubt
that the SEC would require selling literature  explicitly to spell out any
potential for unequal sharing.39
It is, of course, possible  for a society to provide an investment  re-
gime in which unequal treatment is the expectation unless the investor
expressly contracts for equality.  But expectations of unequal treatment
are not the prevalent  concepts  among investors  in our  financial  com-
munity.  Efforts to change these prevailing notions would take time and
would be very costly, if indeed they would even be effective.  Moreover,
they would result in less efficient  arrangements.  If investors  generally
assume that they will be  equally treated,  the least  costly allocation  of
risks  and returns leaves  it to the promoters  or organizing  majority  to
E. BRIGHAM,  MANAGERIAL  FINANCE ch.  17 (7th ed. 1981); J. COHEN & E. ZINBARO,  INVESTMENT
ANALYSIS  AND  PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT  ch. 5 (1977);  W. LEWELLEN,  THE COST OF  CAPITAL 88-
93  (1969).  And some  are more  expliciL  See  N. BUCHANAN,  supra note  15,  at  84.  See also L.
GOWER,  THE PRINCIPLES  OF MODERN  COMPANY  LAW  349-50 (3d ed.  1969); id at 403-05 (4th ed,
1979).
38.  Distributions expressly  payable either in stock or in property at the election of the share-
holders are contemplated by I.R.C. § 305(b)(1)  (1954).  See Rinker v. United States, 297 F. Supp.
370 (S.D. Fla. 1968); Fisher v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 73  (1974).  See generalo B.  BITTKER  & J.
EUSTICE,  FEDERAL  INCOME  TAXATION  OF CORPORATIONS  AND  SHAREHOLDERS  §§ 7.61-.62  (4th
ed.  1979).
39.  If a rule of unequal sharing were permitted, explicit admonition  of potential  inequality
should be required in any such disclosures to investors.  There is reason to believe that people tend
to underestimate  the probability and consequences  of events that  are difficult  to imagine  or be-
yond the realm of normal experience, including failure of complex systems; they also tend to have
illusions of control, with resulting  overly  optimistic  estimates of outcomes that are a matter  of
chance or luck.  See Tversky  & Kalmeman, Judgment Under Uncertainty. Heuristics  and  Biases,
185  SCIENCE 1124 (1974);  Tversky & Kahneman, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of  Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICS  263  (1973);  I.  JANIS & L.  MANN,  DECISION  MAKING  14-17  (1977);  G.
KATONA,  PSYCHOLOGICAL ECONOMICS  ch.  14  (1975);  G.  CALABRESI,  THE COSTS OF  ACCIDENTS
55-57  (1970);  Zeckhauser, Proceduresfor  Valuing Lives, 23  PUB.  POL'Y 419, 437-38  (1975).  The
contingency of disparate distribution on dissolution or going  private or of unequal treatment in a
merger or liquidation  is likely  to be  among such  remote future  events which are  obscured  by
overoptimism when  one buys securities.  Cf. Arrow, supra note 27,  at 1-8.
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contract  out of such treatment if they so  desire.  They  are better able
than the public investors to anticipate  any legitimate needs for non-pro
rata  distributions  to  themselves  and to  specify them.  And providing
exceptions to a general  rule of equality is simple and less costly than
specifying  the exceptions to a general rule of inequality.
40
Accordingly,  corporation  law  and  fiduciary  principle  provide  a
standardized  contract  which  removes  the  element  of uncertainty  by
presuming homogenized treatment of investors of the same class in the
distribution  of  dividends  and  on  liquidation.  Unequal  treatment
would be justified only if expressly provided for in the investment con-
tract. 41  In the  absence  of such  a  provision,  majorities  are not,  and
should not be, permitted to make disparate distributions to themselves
on dissolution.42
40.  See supra note  15.
41.  In theory, minority consent could be inferred from express waiver of equality of distribu-
tion at the time of dissolution, upon full disclosure of the magnitude of the disproportionate distri-
bution.  That solution would be feasible if the minority  consisted of a single person (although it
would give him  "holdup" powers).  But when, as is the case in publicly held companies, the mi-
nority consists of dispersed  investors, whipsaw  possibilities  obstruct volition.  And in any event,
the volitional character of consent solicited  through the proxy machinery is, if not  fictional, not
comparable  to the consent  of a single owner of all the minority stock or even the consent  of a
majority in a context where no controller exists.  See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair  Shares in Corpo-
rate Mergers and Takeovers, 88  HARV.  L. REv.  297, 340  n.89 (1974);  Brudney  & Chirelstein, A
Restatement of Corporate  Freezeouts,  87 YALE L.J. 1354,  1359 (1978)  [hereinafter cited as Brudney
& Chirelstein, Corporate  Freezeouts];  Weiss, The Law of Take-Out  fergers: A HistoricalPerspec-
tive, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 624,  676-77 (1981);  Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE  L.J.  1477,  1485-87
(1958)  (reviewing J. LIVINGSTON,  THE  AMERICAN  STOCKHOLDER  (1958)).
42.  It does not detract from this conclusion that stockholders subject themselves to manage-
rial and majority  rule about the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise.  The premise of all "for
profit"  enterprise is  that  those who  conduct  its affairs will  seek to maximize  the wealth  of its
stockholders.  For "the initial position"  of the investors, therefore, to contemplate that manage-
ment, and indeed the majority of the stockholders, may make decisions with respect to the profit-
seeking use of corporate assets which a minority opposes implies consent, ex ante, to corporate
action  designed  to increase  the value  of the enterprise.  It does  not  imply consent  to majority
decisions having to do with disparate distribution of the assets among the members of the class-
at least if no equivalent compensating increase in the values being distributed to each results from
permitting the disparate dividend.
Nor is a rule of equal treatment  in distributions and reorganizations  incompatible  with the
evolution of American corporation law that has resulted in eliminating each shareholder's veto on
fundamental  changes  in corporate  structure  or purpose,  and  has permitted,  within  limits,  the
forced cashing  out of his common  shares.  See generally Manning, The Shareholder's  Appraisal
Remedy  An Essayfor Frank Coker, 72 YALE LJ. 223,  246 n.38 (1962);  Weiss, supra note 41  at
626-41;  Carney, Fundamental  Corporate Changes,  Minority Shareholders,  and  Business Purposes,
1980  AM. B.  FOUND.  RESEARCH J. 69, 77-97;  Greene, Corporate  Freeze-out  Mergers: A Proposed
Analysis, 28  STAN.  L. REv.  487, 487 n.3 (1976).  The effect of this evolution has been to create
flexibility for the expansive management of aggregations of capital.  To eliminate a veto in order
to facilitate added  risk-taking by a majority or by management in pursuit of larger profit for the
common venture neither requires nor suggests open ended permission to alter the terms of sharing
among stockholders  for the benefit of controlling shareholders and at the expense of others.CALIFORNIA  LAW REVIEW
b.  Implementing the Requirement of Equal Treatment
In the absence of a rule of formal identity of treatment, the uncer-
tainties  as to the values being distributed suggest that enforcing a rule
of substantively  equal  treatment  would  present  costs  and  difficulties
that would assure some inequality of result.
4 3  While it is for the most
part  academic, the question whether a  requirement of formal identity
of treatment would be too costly raises several relevant issues.  It also
has implications  for  the  "going  private"  problem.  If the business  is
worth more as a going concern than disassembled and sold, it is plainly
preferable to keep the business intact.  To effect that result while pre-
serving equality of participation requires either:  (1) precluding dissolu-
tion and letting the controller  continue  the venture;  or (2)  permitting
dissolution and either forcing a sale to a stranger or permitting the con-
troller to buy it for cash at a higher price than strangers bid.
The best assurance  of equality  of distribution  on dissolution,  at
least where the controller is not a publicly held parent corporation, is to
sell the enterprise for cash and distribute the proceeds.  To do that re-
quires  sale  to, or  solicitation of bids by,  strangers.44  Anything  other
than  a sale of the business to a stranger  or at a sale price  above that
which a stranger would pay is likely (because of valuation ambiguities
and costs of policing) to constitute an appropriation by the controller of
a disproportionate share of the value of the enterprise.  To force him to
find a buyer may impose a cost45-unless  the common per share inter-
est of the controller and the other investors in the best sale price results
in the controller pressing to find the highest price  available.
If the controller is able to put the assets to more profitable use than
43.  See supra note 30.
44.  To suggest that the controller  be "forced" to sell to a stranger is to suggest an analogue  to
the power of a partner or in some jurisdictions  a minority shareholder in a close corporation, see,
e.g.,  Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 370 N.E.2d 345 (1977),  to compel sale of the enterprise in a
judicial  proceeding,  MINN.  STAT.  ANN.  §  302A.751(a)  (West  1983).  See also Hetherington  &
Dooley, Illiquidity and  Exploitation: A Proposed  Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corpo.
ration Problem, 63 VA. L. RE.  1 (1977).  Formally, the minority stockholder in a public corpora-
tion has no such power.  But a rule of equal treatment  will give him comparable  leverage.  To be
sure, a bargained  "settlement"  between controllers  and outsiders  is less feasible  in the case  of a
public corporation than in the case of a private firm.  But the limited ability of a dispersed minor-
ity  to bargain-either  effectively or responsibly-is a cost of being  public which  is  not self-evi-
dently to be borne fully by the minority, even  in the interest of a theoretical social gain.  Cf. infra
text accompanying  note 148.
45.  The administrative  cost of finding a best user is no impediment to the controller's search
for a best use.  It is allocable to the business.  If the controller does the searching and incurs special
costs he can be compensated  as would any other agent for finding a buyer.  But apart  from such
identifiable compensation for work done, to allow the controller to take more than his proportion-
ate share for consenting to sell the entire business (not merely control) is not rationally necessary
to induce him to permit or initiate the sale, any more than allowing him to steal from the company
is rationally  necessary in order to induce his consent.
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strangers can, the minority is no worse  off, and society is better off, if
the controller is allowed to purchase the business at a higher price than
a stranger offers.  Whether a regime that permits him to do so will in-
hibit his efforts to find a buyer or will chill  strangers' bids is problem-
atic.  Those  effects  are  neither  implausible  nor  unknown.46  They
suggest that requiring a sale to a stranger and severing the controller's
connection  with  the business  may well  be  preferable  to  allowing  an
auction in which the controller  can bid.
It does not preclude  that conclusion  that requiring  a third-party
sale may  induce the controller  to retain  control of a business without
dissolving it, and permit him to make continuous improper diversion of
increased profits to himself. To be sure,  a nice  question is raised as to
whether it is desirable to prevent improper diversion  by the controller
on liquidation, if to effect that prevention he is encouraged to continue
diverting assets to himself in drips and drabs on a continuing  basis.  It
has been noted that the fiduciary rules governing management's  or the
controlling stockholders'  daily conduct of corporate affairs permit slip-
page which allows greater diversions from stockholders  than any level
of acceptable  agency  costs  should rationally allow.47  That  condition
requires  attention,  and  more  faithful  judicial  enforcement  of  the
proclaimed  fiduciary rules.48  But it does not justify allowing control-
lers to exploit the loose operation of fiduciary rules by appropriating in
one transaction the  capitalized  value  of the  perquisites  they may  be
able to extract improperly  over time.49
2.  Going Private
Going private, whether effected through an issuer's tender offer, by
a leveraged  buyout, or simply by merger  with a dummy corporation,
46.  See, e.g.,  SEC, REPORT  ON THE STUDY  AND  INVESTIGATION  OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES,
PERSONNEL AND  FUNCTIONS  OF PROTECTIVE  AND  REORGANIZATION  COMMITTEES  pt. VIII at 17-
19 (1940).
47.  See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 1, at 744-48,  757-61.
48.  It has been suggested that the markets set appropriate limits on the "slippage" permitting
agents to divert assets from shareholders.  See Jensen & Meckling, supra note-i; Fama, supra note
1; Winter, State Law, Shareholder  Protection and  the Theory of  the Corporation,  6 J. LEGAL STUD.
251  (1977).  Whether society would be better off if all slack were eliminated from  agency costs by
rules which both tighten restrictions and greatly reduce  the need to monitor has been debated at
length.  See, e.g.,  Anderson, supra note 1, at 777-93; Cary, Federalism  and  Corporate  Law: Reflec-
tions Upon Delaware, 83  YALE L.J. 663  (1974).  That there is some room for improvement, how-
ever, is not often  denied.
49.  Nor does it follow from the risk of  such behavior that a rational investor should choose a
rule which allows him  to receive  a premium over market price  from the controller  and enables
him to "get out" with cash.  He might rationally conclude  that generally the likelihood under that
rule of his being forced out at a price lower than imminently realizable value is great enough  to
make a rule of equal treatment preferable even if in some cases he will lose a premium or run the
risk of the controller's  efforts to divert assets on a continuing basis.  See infra note 67.
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is a process for eliminating public stockholders by acquiring their stock
for a price (generally in cash) that is somewhat higher than the prevail-
ing market price.  On the assumption that such transactions are unilat-
eral and coercive-actually coercive to the extent they are mergers;  and
effectively  coercive  in  the case  of initial  buy  backs  by  tender  offers
which  threaten  the market  liquidity  of the  public's  shares-they  are
likely to force precisely the same inequality as would a disparate distri-
bution on dissolution.  The controller  keeps the  "real"  assets  and the
minority  receives  cash.  Is there any reason  to  dilute the principle  of
equality, either in substance  or in form for such  transactions?  If the
principle  of equality  requires,  so  far  as  possible,  formal  identity  of
treatment among shares in liquidating distributions, should it preclude
going private transactions?
The arguments for going private focus on the "savings"  which the
process effects.  The essential contention is that by reducing costs, going
private increases  the profitability and therefore the value of the corpo-
ration. 50  Few of the commentators on going private,51 and none of the
courts  dealing  with  the  problem,  however,  urge  realization  of those
gains by a rule of substantive inequality-i.e., that the cashed out pub-
lic  should  receive  less  per  share  than  the  controlling  stockholders,
whether the difference is a function of hidden values not reflected in the
price of the corporation's  stock or of cost savings or otherwise.  Since
going  private  is  simply  an  alternative  process  for  effecting  the
equivalent of distributions  in dissolution, all the reasons for believing
that a  rule permitting  disparate  treatment  on  liquidation  is both  too
costly  and  inequitable  argue  against  invoking  such  a rule  for  going
private.
If substantively equal treatment is the appropriate  rule, the  ques-
tions remain whether it can be achieved  without categorically  forbid-
ding  going  private,  and  if not,  whether  the  cost  of  thus  effecting
formally equal treatment is worth the benefit.  The argument for a cate-
gorical rule  rests principally  on the  difficulty,  if not impossibility,  of
enforcing a rule of substantively equal treatment if each  case must be
litigated to determine  whether unrevealed values  in the firm exist and
are properly taken into account in the price  offered.52
The voluminous literature on going private  alludes to some  dubi-
50.  See Wolfson, supra note  9, at 978-80;  Easterbrook  & Fischel, supra note  8, at  729-30;
Solomon, Going Private, 25 BuFFALo  L. REv. 141,  143 (1975);  Note,  Going Private, 84 YALE L.J.
903,  907  (1975);  Borden, supra note  17,  at  1006-13.  But see Brudney  &  Chirelstein,  Corporate
Freezeouts,  supra note 41,  at 1366-67.
51.  But see, e.g.,  Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 728-31.
52.  See Brudney, supra note 27; Brudney, A Note on "Going Private," 61  VA.  L. REv.  1019,
1023-25  (1975)  [hereinafter cited as Brudney,  Going Private];  Brudney &  Chirelstein, supra note
41.  Cf. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,572,  [Current]  FED. SEC.  L. REP.  (CCH)  24,115
(Feb. 15,  1979).
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ous costs of a categorical prohibition,53 but the more serious claims are
that  such a prohibition:  (a) would prevent elimination of the agency
costs and the expenses  of being public, such  as  compliance  with the
federal  securities  laws,  and the other apparatus  that aids investors  in
monitoring  management;  and (b) would  cause public investors to lose
premiums  above the market price of their stock  which they might be
paid in the contrived merger  or repurchase.
5 4
(a)
The savings derived from being private instead of public are hard
to  determine,  and even  harder  to evaluate  against  the costs of going
private.  The elimination of law compliance expenses  is apt to be more
than trivial as a percentage of total costs in the case of smaller compa-
nies;  but  it  becomes  less  significant  as  the  size  of the  company  in-
creases. 5  On  the other hand, the costs of acquiring those savings  by
going private, although only  a one-shot  expense,  are not irrelevant. 6
The claimed  savings  in agency  costs  when controllers  become  100%
owners may be theoretically real,57 but they are of uncertain practical
import.5"  To a large extent they are apt to constitute little more than a
redistribution of returns.59
The claimed gains from permitting going private must be weighed
53.  The  notion that distributing  corporate cash by  repurchase  of stock is a socially useful
transfer of cash from  a less desirable  to a more desirable use, see Petty  & Pinkerton,  The Stock
Repurchase Decision:  A Market Perspective, I J. AccT.  AUDITING  & FIN.  99  (1978),  has been
urged as support for going private transactions, Hetherington, supra note 9, at 239.  A corporate
repurchase program not designed to "go  private" may possibly reflect a lack of profitable use by
the  repurchasing  firm for  the funds.  But  that lack  of profitable  use is  not  congruent  with the
assumptions about the contemplated development of the firm that goes private-particularly  when
it is effected with borrowed funds. See Brudney, Going  Private,  supra note 52, at 1046 n.89 (1975).
Whatever may be the costs theoretically imposed on publicly held firms by disclosure require-
ments, there is little or no basis  to believe  that the costs are of practical significance.  Indeed, if
losing the competitive  advantage of some new development  is a significant disclosure  cost to the
firm, news of that development is presumably of particular interest to the frozen out investor, who
should either be given the information  or not be frozen out.
54.  See Borden, supra note 17,  at  1015;  Hetherington, supra note 9, at 243,  247.
55.  Cf. Borden, supra note 17,  at 1002-03 (arguing that for small issuers,  a per se prohibition
of going private  transactions  would work  a hardship  on the issuer without any  corresponding
public gain); See  S.  PHILLIPS & J. ZECHER, THE SEC AND  THE  PUBLIC INTttsT 49 (1979).
56.  See Brudney, Going Private,  supra note 52, at 1033.
57.  See  Wolfson, supra note 9,  at 979.  But, if the initial going  public correctly  reflected
agency costs, as Jensen and Meckling suggest, see supra note 1, in a rational world it can only have
occurred  if there was a larger social gain to going public.  Unless circumstances can be shown to
have changed materially by the time of going private, the act of doing so will lose that net gain.
58.  Cf. supra text accompanying note 25.
59.  The added  perquisites and tax avoidance  that insiders gain from going private are not
gains to the corporation or to society.  The fact that the company  has not been as successful as
expected when it went public and therefore that its stock is not as useful for corporate purposes
(e.g., compensation options or acquisition currency) as initially contemplated does not make goingCALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1072
against  the costs.  Going  private  entails  losing  the  benefits  of being
public, including the benefits of diversifying the risks of the enterprise
by having public investors,  and by increasing  investors'  opportunities
to diversify by having more investment vehicles.  Moreover, to the ex-
tent that the risks  attending  a rule permitting  going private  are  ade-
quately  disclosed,60  fears  and uncertainties  will  be  generated  among
potential initial investors about unfairness to them in subsequent going
private transactions.  Hence,  to permit  going private without  assuring
equal treatment,  in sharing both the savings  and the value of the ex-
pected increase  in earnings,"  will raise the cost of going public. 62
In short, the recital of dollars and intangible values saved by going
private does not justify the conclusion that permitting such transactions
offers  a social  gain  unless the costs,  tangible and intangible,  are  also
weighed.  No such weighing has been, or is likely to be, done in empiri-
cal studies.  But the considerations supporting a rule of equal treatment
in the liquidation  context suggest that significant  costs will attend  any
rule  which permits  controllers  to yield to  their natural  desire  to  take
all-and more than all--of the benefits from going private, (including
private  a value  increasing event.  The nonpublic  stock  is no better  for such  corporate purposes
than the depressed public stock.
Elimination of the cost of policing self-dealing  may be a significant social saving if the con-
troller is a parent corporation which transacts regular business with its subsidiary.  But it is less
likely to reduce costs if the controllers  are private individuals.  See Eisenberg, The LegalRoles of
Shareholders  and Management in Modern Corporate  Decisionmaking, 57  CALIF.  L. REv.  1, 132
(1969).
60.  The misuse of inside information  in going private transactions  is most likely to occur in
the case of the smaller companies for which going private is most feasible.  While inside informa-
tion exists for most companies, the smaller ones (for which the cost of being public is proportion-
ately largest) are the firms for which the concealed information is likely to be the most significant,
because the market for stocks  of those firms is  least likely to impound the  inside information in
their price.  And efforts  by outsiders  to litigate the "value"  questions are fraught with costly im-
pediments.  See supra note  30.
61.  The  notion that the insider could  mistakenly  appraise  the unrevealed  information  too
favorably and therefore mistakenly cause corporate purchase of the stock at too high a price is not
demonstrated by studies showing that corporate repurchase programs  are often followed by mar-
ket prices lower than the repurchase price.  See Hetherington, supra note 9, at 236 n.169; studies
cited supra note 28.  The reasons  impelling repurchase  (in  contrast  to going  private)  programs
include  raising or stabilizing the price of stock at  a level which management  believes  desirable.
The fact that the market still believes the stock is worth less than management's repurchase price
after the repurchase program terminates suggests that management's valuation was indeed faulty
and that the market's prior estimate was correct.  But in going private programs the tilt is not quite
the same.  If the repurchase  will favor the direct pecuniary  interest of the repurchaser,  as is con-
templated in the case of going private, there is good reason to believe that the inside information
will be more accurately perceived by the purchaser than by the market.  And the information need
not be-and is not likely to be-of the kind that either law or private effort will flush out so as to
affect  the market  price at  the time of purchase.  Hence  reliance  on disclosure requirements  to
protect stockholders is least  valid in such cases.
62.  As noted, supra text accompanying notes 31 & 32, the risk of being frozen out cannot be
diversified away.
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unrevealed  enterprise values)  are apt to be significant.  Certainly they
are  sufficient to  cast substantial  doubt upon the magnitude of the net
social gains,  if any, from going private, or from a rule which permits
going private but imposes the costs of litigating to determine  whether
equal treatment has been accorded.63
(b)
The suggestion that a rule of equality will preclude individual in-
vestors from receiving more than the market price for their shares has
merit only if the market correctly prices their stock (i.e., reflects  all rele-
vant information) when the firm goes  private;  or if there is no  other
mode of allocating to each investor the "real" value of his shares in that
enterprise (including expected  improvement).  But neither condition is
likely to be true.
To the extent that market prices do not correctly reflect the value
of stocks of firms  which insiders seek to take private, public investors
are likely to benefit by a rule forbidding going private.  There is good
reason to believe that controlling stockholders (whose interest in doing
so is more pointed than disinterested managers') will take the company
private when the market errs in their favor because it does not yet have
their inside information about the firm's improving prospects.64  While
systematic empirical evidence of this practice is not available,6 5  and in
any particular case  insiders may be wrong, it would  certainly be con-
63.  Even if going private saves agency and disclosure  costs by eliminating the need for them,
see Lowenstein, supra note 27, the question still remains whether the controller should be empow-
ered unilaterally  to determine  when those costs should be saved and whether or how the savings
should be shared.  It is no answer to this fairness problem simply to assert, as though extrinsic fate
or even a third person offering an arm's-length  price and expecting  to profit from acquiring  and
improving the venture  were determinants  of the price paid  to the public, cf. infra note 64, that
costs are being saved for society.  It is particularly an inadequate answer when contrasted with the
possibility that comparable savings for society may be made by selling the entire venture to a third
party.  The price  paid by  a third party  may  well  bring more  to the  minority investor  without
litigation than the going private price offered by the controllers,  even after litigation to "correct"
it.  See supra note 44.
64.  See, e.g.,  Berkowitz v. Power/Mate  Corp.,  135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566  (1975); In  re
Talley Indus., Investment Company Act Release No. 5953,  [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED.  SEC.
L. REP. (CCH)  77,774, at 83,792 (Jan. 9, 1970).  See also supra note 29.  The notion that manage-
ment  can  disclose  information  which  outside  bidders  cannot  disclose,  see,  e.g.,  Hetherington,
supra note 9, at 235, does not mean that management will disclose it---although recent SEC efforts
increase the probability of its doing so, see SEC Rule  13e-3,  17  C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-3, 240.13e-100
(1981).  Hetherington states that "[t]here is a fair and adequate price which represents the invest-
ment value" of an investor's shares, and that the investor should be allowed  to receive that price
even at the cost of expulsion  from the venture.  Hetherington, supra note 9, at 249.  But if some-
where in the sky there exists a fair price, that price is not inevitably offered in the market during a
going private operation.  On the contrary, at that time the market is likely to be skewed systemati-
cally to the disadvantage of the public investor.  If equality is the test, the fair price is not likely to
be paid in that market.
65.  But see supra note 29.CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1072
trary to their economic interests  to refrain from attempting to achieve
and  retain  such  gains.  And  the  temptation  to  yield  to  self-interest
would be enhanced by market imperfections for (and the manipulabil-
ity  of prices  of)  stocks  of precisely  those  companies  that  are  small
enough to go private.
While  going  private  thus  is likely  to  deprive  outsiders  of their
equal share of the firm's  enhanced value, arguably it gives them more
than they would get if a rule of equality precluded insiders from going
private.  But the fact that a rule of equal treatment would thus preclude
payments of premiums to public investors for their stock need not pre-
clude them from receiving their aliquot share of the firm's true value, at
least to the extent reflected in the proffered premium.66  If the control-
ler is prevented from going private in such circumstances, the venture
will continue public and the minority holders will share in the not re-
mote  future  gains  whose  potential  is not  yet reflected  in  its  market
price.  If controllers do not wish to continue with the minority as their
66.  The suggestion that a prohibition on going private reflects a view that "the interest  of
shareholders in receiving more money [for their stock] is irrelevant,"  Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note  8, at 730, is no more accurate than would be the attribution of a similar view to those who
would prevent management from seeking competing bids in takeover contests. See Easterbrook  &
Fischel, The Proper  Role ofa Target'r  Management  in Responding  to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV.  L.
REv. 1161,  1164 (1981).  The notion that a rule thus designed to protect stockholders impedes their
"free choice" to sell to the corporation at a price they choose assumes that they have "free choice."
Cf. Hetherington, supra note 9,  at 241,  242 n.183 (arguing that, as a general principle, sharehold-
ers benefit from rules that offer them a chance to receive premiums for their shares).  But if the
market is skewed, their choice is not quite so "free,"  particularly if they are under pressure to sell
in a going private atmosphere.  In  that context, the premium  offered  to investors  is somewhat
illusory.  It is an economic increment only if the market price is not skewed or the "real"  value  of
the stock is not otherwise available to investors.  Real value is more likely to be available to them
under a rule which discourages controllers'  efforts to depress the market and encourages control-
lers more quickly to reveal favorable information  (because  they are  precluded  from  using it for
their own trading  benefit).  Investors could rationally prefer a rule  under which sometimes they
would not gain  (because a premium over market cannot be paid) but more often they would gain
in possibly  larger amounts  (because they will  not be  deprived  of values not  reflected in  stock
prices).
It is not, as Hetherington suggests, the power of a majority to exclude  a minority that  is at
issue.  See id.  at 246.  It is the lack of minority power to bargain over the terms of exclusion.  If a
dispersed minority of public investors does not have the power of a minority partner (or occasion-
ally of a minority shareholder  in a close corporation) to bridle  the majority's greed  by threat of
liquidation to be enforced in court, some other remedy is needed.  A flat prohibition against going
private implicates such  a remedy--sale  by the controller of the enterprise to a stranger.  To push
the analogy further toward that of a close corporation by allowing courts to determine the equality
of  price is to perpetuate the dispersed minority's disadvantage; the minority's power to litigate to a
fair conclusion is  as much less than  a partner's  as their bargaining  power if they cannot  force
liquidation.
67.  The controller's decision to remain public is not as dangerous to public investors as has
been suggested.  Hetherington, supra note 9, at 248-49.  The enterprise,  although controlled  by a
single power, is not wholly private.  A market exists for its stock and a prohibition against going
private will prevent forced  contraction of that market.  The insiders' ability to keep the  market
depressed  attenuates as time  goes on.  Hence  if there  is an unrevealed  potential  at the  time of
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partners, they can sell the enterprise to third persons.  It is not unrea-
sonable to suppose that noncontrollers  are likely to benefit more from
such sales than from allowing the controller to determine what price he
will pay to eliminate them.68
Neither  the  state  statutes nor the  cases  deal  effectively  with the
problem of going private.  Judicial interpretation of the merger statutes
has rarely  precluded  majorities  from  eliminating  public  investors  by
merger with  a  dummy corporation.69  While  a few  courts have  sug-
gested that fiduciary considerations forbid, or at least limit, the exercise
of such  power, the answers  they  have  given  are not  entirely  clear.70
The  cases  all  appear  to assume  that  all  stockholders  should  receive
equivalent  values per share  in the  "breakup"  of the  old corporation.
But the next step to assure such equivalence-insistence  upon identical
distributions, or a categorical prohibition against going private-is not
easily  taken.  Courts are apparently  fearful that such a step will  pre-
clude going private transactions which increase the value of the corpo-
ration  or the wealth  of individual  stockholders.  On the other  hand,
they appear to be apprehensive that implementing the equality princi-
going private, it is likely to be recognized in the market over time.  While the possibility remains
that  controllers  will  make  continuous  improper  diversions of assets  over  time, that  cost  is no
greater by reason of a rule prohibiting going private than it would be without such a rule. There is
reason to strengthen the rules against such diversion rather than to permit it to occur more effec-
tively by means of a single going private transaction.
68.  See supra text accompanying note 44.
69.  See  Bryan v. Brock  & Blevins Co.,  490 F.2d 563  (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.  844
(1974);  Berkowitz  v. Power/Mate  Corp.,  135 N.J.  Super. 36, 342  A.2d 566 (1975).  State merger
statutes  appear to permit  the formally  disparate distribution contemplated  in going private and
parent-subsidiary cash-out  mergers.  Long-form statutes,  as well as short-form  statutes, contem-
plate payment by merging corporations of cash or redeemable securities to all  stockholders of the
merging partner.  See, e.g.,  MODEL  BUSINESS  CORP.  ACT  §§ 71,  75  (1979).  It may plausibly be
argued that permission to pay anything other than common stock of a corporation in a merger was
given  in long-form  merger statutes  solely to facilitate  arm's-length  mergers,  and should not be
applicable  to parent-subsidiary  mergers or to going private mergers.  Bryan v.  Brock & Blevins
Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.  denied, 419 U.S.  844 (1974).  Weiss, supra note 41,  at 632-
33.  Although that contention is at odds with the short-form  merger legislation and the two-step
acquisition by  tender offer and merger, cf. id. at  641; Krafcisin  v. LaSalle  Madison Hotel  Co.,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) %  93,586 (N.D. Ill. June  19,  1972) (minority
shareholders have no right to continued participation in the enterprise  and may be cashed out in a
tender offer prior to a reorganization), it need not preclude  a requirement of "all  common stock"
mergers for absorptions of subsidiaries  by long term parents owning up to 90% of a subsidiary's
stock.  Cf. CAL. CORP.  CODE  § I101(e) (West Supp. 1983)  (holders of shares of the same class of
stock of any constituent corporation in a merger must be treated equally in distributions of cash,
property, rights or securities).
70.  See Bryan  v. Brock  & Blevins Co.,  490 F.2d 563  (5th Cir.),  cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844
(1974);  Berkowitz  v. Power/Mate  Co.,  135  N.J.  Super.  36,  342 A.2d  566  (1975);  Jutkowitz  v.
Bourns, No. C.A. 000268 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov.  19,  1975); Kaufmann v. Lawrence,  386 F. Supp. 12
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), al'dper  cuiam,  514 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975); Outwater v. Public Serv. Corp.,  103
NJ. Eq. 461,  143 A. 729 (Ch. 1928), af'dper  curiam,  104 N.J. Eq. 490, 146 A. 916 (1929).
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ple by a "fairness"  standard would be difficult to administer.
7'  Hence
they  fret  and  discourage,  but  do  not  forbid,  "going  private"
transactions.72
Similar tensions  have afflicted  the SEC's treatment  of going pri-
vate  transactions.  While  at one  time  it stated,  although not without
sharp  opposition  from  the  organized  securities  bar,  that  it  had  the
power to require a going private transaction  to be  "fair, 73  it has not
imposed  that requirement.  Instead,  it has receded  to  the position  of
requiring disclosure of relevant information including reasons for con-
sidering the transaction to be fair.'
If a categorical prohibition is too costly,  a rule of equal treatment
may be  implemented,  albeit less  effectively  and not  without  cost,  by
judicial  or  administrative  appointment  of negotiators7 5  to act for  the
minority in going private, or by requiring prior approval of the transac-
tion by an administrative  agency or the courts.  But if the priniciple of
substantive equality is appropriate, nothing short of such requirements
would make it effective.
C  Parent-Subsidiary  Mergers
Is there any reason to permit a publicly held parent corporation to
71.  In addition to the difficulty of adducing relevant data and determining permissible infer-
ences of value, see Brudney, supra note 27,  there may be problems of determining  standards  of
fairness.  Equality  of treatment  is  not  the  theme of all  conceptions  of fairness  in assessing  the
propriety of the price paid to investors in going private freezeouts, at least when  the freezeout  is
the second step in a takeover.  See, e.g.,  Chazen,  Fairnessfrom  a Financial  Point of View inAcquisi-
tions of  Public Companies: Is  "Third  Party Sale Value" the Appropriate  Standard?,  36 Bus.  LAW.
1439  (1981).
72.  There is no more reason to tolerate  disparate treatment of minority stockholders  in cases
where  corporations  go public in a coerced  reorganization  than  to do so where corporations  go
private.  Judicial uncertainty about prescribing  a categorical prohibition in such cases is suggested
in Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.,  I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81  Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).  The result
in that case may be explained  by the court's uncertainty  as to the significance of contributions  of
additional assets by the controllers  to, and therefore assumption of added risks in, the reorganized
enterprise by which going public was effected.
73.  Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14,185,  [1977-1978 Transfer  Binder] FED.  SEC.  L.
REP. (CCH)  81,366 (Nov.  17,  1977).
74.  SEC Rule  13e-3,  17  C.F.R. §§ 140.13e-3,  240.13e-100;  Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 16,075, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)  82,166 (Aug. 2,  1979); cf.  Securities
Exchange Act Release No.  15,572,  [Current]  FED. SEC.  L.  RaP. (CCH)  24,115 (Feb.  15,  1979).
75.  See,  e.g, In  re  Woods  Corp.,  Securities  Exchange  Act  Release  No.  15,337,  16  SEC
DoCKET  166  (1978)  (consent  case);  In  re  Spartek,  Inc.,  Securities  Exchange  Act  Release  No.
15,567,  [1979 Transfer Binder]  FED.  SEC.  L. REP.  (CCH)  81,961  (Feb. 14,  1979) (same);  SEC v.
Beisinger Indus. Corp., 552 F.2d  15  (1st Cir. 1977), a.f'g 421 F. Supp.  691 (D. Mass.  1976)  (con-
tested case involving appointment of agents to effect compliance  with law in the future);  SEC v,
Koenig, 469 F.2d  198 (2d Cir.  1972)  (same); SEC  v. Western  Geothermal  & Power  Corp., [1979
Transfer Binder]  FED. SEC.  L. REP. (CCH)  96,920 (D. Ariz. May 23,  1979) (same),  Seealso SEC
v. Data  Access Sys.,  [1982 Transfer Binder]  FED.  SEC.  L. REP.  (CCH)  98,779 (D.N.J. Aug.  17,
1982); Chazen, supra note 71, at 1467.  Cf.  PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNENCE  AND  STRUC-
TURE:  RESTATEMENT AND  RECOMMENDATIONS  § 703(0 (Tent. Draft No.  1, 1982)  (ALI proposal
for settlement of derivative  suits by court appointment of special panel).
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make unequal distributions  to its  subsidiary's  stockholders upon  dis-
solving or merging its subsidiary?76
1.  Entitlement to Equal Distribution
The claim that minority stockholders  should be willing to accept
anything more than the market price for their stock no more supports a
rule  of disparate  treatment in the case  of a parent-subsidiary  merger
than in liquidation or going private transactions.  The integrity of that
market price as  a reflection of value  is not unsullied.  The parent  can,
and there  is  reason  to believe  it does,  affect  the market  price of the
subsidiary's  stock in anticipation of a merger.77  The parent thus can
take advantage  of the minority because that price does not then reflect
fair value.  Hence  market price is not likely to be an adequate subtra-
hend in calculating  stockholder  gain.  Any rational stockholder  faced
with such a prospect ex ante will see little or no likelihood of personal
gain, and rightly fear  losses  from such mergers.  One result of a rule
allowing such disparate treatment, therefore, will be to increase the cost
of capital. 78
To be sure, a minority investor in the subsidiary of a publicly held
parent may, to  a limited  extent, be able to diversify the risk  of being
mulcted in a subsidiary  by acquiring the potential for being rewarded
in  a parent.79  The  actual  distribution  of stockholdings,  as well  as  a
certain  amount  of  observed  investor  "irrationality," 80  suggests  that
even  in a  perfect  market many  investors are not-and  are not likely
ever to be8 '-sufficiently diversified to avoid undue unsystematic  eco-
nomic risk.
76.  State merger statutes appear to permit such formally disparate distributions.  See Alcott
v.  Hyman,  208  A.2d  501,  508  (Del.  1965);  Abelow  v. Midstates  Oil Corp.,  189 A.2d  675  (Del.
1963); See  CAL.  CORP.  CODE  § 1001  (West  1977  & Supp.  1983).  But they  do  not  suggest that
substantive disparity  is permissible.
77.  See supra note 29; TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976);  Atchley v. Qonaar
Corp., [Current]  FED. SEC.  L. RaE.  (CCH)  99,155 (7th Cir. Apr. 1, 1983).  See also M. Jensen &
R. Ruback, The Market  for Corporate Control  The Scientific Evidence 27 (Apr.  1983)  (unpub-
lished manuscript forthcoming  in volume  I1  of the Journal  of  Financial  Economics). And in any
event, the value of 100% ownership may be greater per share than market price.  See Lowenstein,
supra note 27.
78.  A system which permits such diversion  by controllers entails further costs.  See text ac-
companying notes 31-33.
79.  See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 711-14.
80.  See Arrow, supra note 27; Kahn, supra note 27, at  24.
81.  If, as the  New York Stock  Exchange reports,  NEW  YORK  STOCK EXCHANGE,  SHARE-
HOLDER  OWNERSHIP  1981, at 2, 26-27, more than 60% of the approximately 30 million adult indi-
vidual stock investors own stock having a value of less than $10,000 (48% with a value of less than
$5,000), a fairly large portion of individual investors is not likely to be adequately diversified.  The
report  indicates that  five  percent of those investors have  invested  exclusively  in equity mutual
funds and about  10%  more have some equity  mutual fund stocks in their holdings.  Unless such
investors invest only in appropriate mutual  funds they will not be adequately diversified.
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However that may be, the argument that investors in a subsidiary
of a publicly held parent may diversify away the risk of being mulcted
faces  some a priori obstacles.  It is not that the investor must seek  to
own stock in the parent of the subsidiary in which he invests.  It is that
the investor's  range  of choices  of potential parents  is skewed  against
him.  Privately  owned  parents  are  unavailable;  and  there  are  fewer
public parents  than nonparents,  and fewer potential parents than po-
tential  subsidiaries.82  Moreover,  the investor can not be  certain  that
parents  in which  he  invests  will  not  become  subsidiaries,  otherwise
cease to be parents, or cease to be publicly held parents.  And finally,
investors must exercise some degree of selectivity among parents in or-
der to find enterprises which combine appropriate economic risk-return
characteristics  with the right mulcting potential.83
The cost and limited effectiveness of the search for an appropriate
parent affect, if they do not eliminate, the investor's ability to diversify
adequately  the risk  of being mulcted.  Resort  to such  diversification
adds more to the cost of capital than does the conventional diversifica-
tion to avoid unsystematic economic risk.84  And-in some indeterminate
number of cases there will be a failure to diversify adequately.85
It is hard to see the case connecting  the necessity for disparate di-
vision with the merger and its gains.  The only gain envisionable from
the merger results from savings effected in combining the operations  of
82.  Values transferred to (or appropriated  by) private parents are unavailable  to public  in-
vestors to  offset the losses they  incur as owners of stock in subsidiaries.  And since parents can
have many subsidiaries,  but  subsidiaries  rarely have  more  than  one parent,  the distribution  of
investment vehicles  is skewed. See Bebchuk, The Casefor  Facilitating  Competing Tender Offers: A
Reply andExtension, 35  STAN.  L. REv. 23, 27-28  (1982)  (the probability of a company becoming
an acquirer may  differ from the  probability  of its becoming  a target).  It is possible  to diversify
ownership by investing X  dollars in one parent and Y dollars in ten subsidiaries of other parents
by allocating proportionate  ownership  (10%  of Y) to each  subsidiary.  But  the process  imposes
costs beyond those associated with diversification of portfolios for purely economic reasons, espe-
cially in view of the uncertainties  about whether the enterprises will continue as subsidiaries  and
parents.
83.  Costs of diversification are increased to the extent that the size of the mulcting  turns on
the parent's ability to manipulate the market at a particular time, because there is no assurance of
homogeneous mulcting potential among parents.
84.  See supra note 23.  If corporate management owns proportionately more shares of stock
in parents than in subsidiaries  (which seems likely),  investors  in subsidiaries who  diversify  into
parents will inevitably  be unable to enjoy enough  of the gains of mulcting  to offset  their losses
from being mulcted.
85.  The morality of a proposal which requires investors to diversify in order to protect them-
selves against  the appropriative  behavior of controllers,  but  which does not seek  to prevent  the
appropriative behavior itself, is not self-evident.  Whether or not that morality is relevant here, the
inescapable  costs of such  a proposal argue against it, at least  in the absence of any  assurance  of
meaningful gains that require such a rule.  Easterbrook & Fisehel, supra note 8,  at 713,  appear to
suggest that those who  fail to diversify  (statistically apt to be the least wealthy  investors) should
suffer the consequences.  The alternatives  available  to such investors  are to fail to diversify  and
run the risk of being mulcted or to buy mutual funds.
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parent  and subsidiary.  Those savings  may result from  economies  of
scale, elimination of duplicate costs, or financial synergy.  If parent and
subsidiary  are engaged in continuous transactions  with each other, the
merger will  also  eliminate  both the temptation  to  overreach  and the
cost of monitoring  that temptation.  But  those savings  are implicit in
the two  enterprises.  Their  realization  does  not depend  upon the  in-
tercession of a third party with better  ideas or the need to encourage
monitors in the capital markets.  If the discipline of the capital markets
should effect such mergers, it does not require special tribute to be paid
by the subsidiary's public stockholders to the parent.
Moreover, realization  of the gains offered by such mergers entails
no special cost to the parent,  such as that incurred in searching  for a
buyer or planning innovation, or special risk to the parent, such as that
involved  in  commencing  a  new  business.  Any  transaction  costs  or
search  costs  should  appropriately  be borne  by  the  assets  affected-
either  by the  parent's  or the  subsidiary's  or  the combined  venture's.
None of the gains  rests upon  such  substantial added  risks to parents
that they can  claim the added returns of open ended  disproportionate
division. 6  If compensation is needed, it is possible to claim it and at-
tempt to justify it explicitly and allocate it in fixed amounts.  Nor does
the magnitude  of expected  gains  from parent-subsidiary  mergers  call
for large risk taking.  Compared to the potential from third-party merg-
ers, those gains are not apt to be significant.  There is less reason for a
special  reward  as  an inducement  to  the parent  to take the  "risk"  of
combining with a subsidiary than with a stranger.  And a parent is not
entitled to such a reward in the former case simply because of its tech-
nical power to extort it.87
86.  The parent's risk is much less than a stranger's, since its knowledge of the subsidiary's
affairs is much greater.  And the parent's ability and temptation to underpay is much greater than
a stranger's since the counterpart  to the subsidiary in the arm's-length bargain would be uninhib-
ited in seeking a higher price from the stranger.
One possible reason to induce the parent to combine with its subsidiary through the offer of a
premium is to reimburse the parent for the risks entailed when the parent is called upon to finance
a subsidary's opportunity to expand.  See Dower v. Mosser Indus., 648 F.2d  183  (3d Cir.  1981).
But if other sources of finance are equally available to the subsidiary, as they generally should be,
there  is no  reason  to honor  the parent's  claim  to a disproportionate  share.  The parent  is  not
required to lend money to the subsidiary, and the subsidiary is not required to expand.  The issue
thus  remaining  is whether  the possibility  that the parent  is  the  lowest  cost,  or only,  source  of
finance should permit it to overreach.  The intrinsic difficulties in proving that the parent is such a
source make its assumption as a premise for policy very doubtful.  And the certainty of overreach-
ing  leaves  the question  whether  the social  or investor  gain  from  the occasional  case  of "sole
financial  source"  is worth  assuming that all cases are in that category and hence permitting the
regular overreaching  and consequent  increase in the cost of capital.  A negative  answer is more
reasonable than an affirmative  one.
87.  The  limitation thus imposed on the ability of the parent's stockholders to benefit from
disparate distribution of the subsidiary's assets among the subsidiary's stockholders is no more or
less appropriate than the limitations on their ability to benefit at the subsidiary's expense from the
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In sum, the need for a rule of disparate treatment in order to en-
courage  parent-subsidiary  merger  gains is problematic.  The  costs  of
such a rule are less doubtful.  And any uncertainty as to whether, or the
extent to which, the costs outweigh the gains must reckon with consid-
erations of fairness based on investor expectations.  Those expectations
impel enforcement of a rule of equality-or a requirement of advance
warning to investors of the risks of unequal treatment.88
2.  Implementing the Requirement of Equal Treatment
To conclude that the parent  is entitled,  in economic terms, to no
more than its aliquot share of the value of the subsidiary's contribution
to  the combined enterprise leaves  open the question  of how  to deter-
mine that share in the merged venture,  and how best to assure equal
treatment.  In the case of a publicly held parent corporation, unlike the
case  of a private  controller,  it is  possible to  address  the problem  of
equality by focusing on a larger constituency  than the stockholders  of
the subsidiary.  One can view all stockholders of both enterprises as the
constituency  to  be  treated  equally  by  a  single  management  having
equivalent responsibilities to each.89  Equality in form may be achieved
parent's inside information about the subsidiary's affairs or the parent's power to self deal with the
subsidiary.
The argument that parents should be allowed  to appropriate  subsidiaries'  opportunities  be-
cause appropriation is simply a substitute for foregoing the opportunity and instead covertly com-
pensating themselves from the subsidiary's till, see Easterbrook & Fisehel, supra note 8, at 733-35,
proves too much.  So does the argument that managers' freedom to appropriate corporate oppor-
tunities  is a substitute  for overt compensation.  Both rest on the notion that the compensation  for
which appropriation of the opportunity is a substitute legitimately can be taken by the parent  or
management.  But the legitimacy of such compensation,  as of such appropriation,  whether viewed
as a matter of morals or of economics, depends at least upon the informed consent of the deprived
stockholders after a showing of worth.  That consent is sufficiently improbable that few managers
would tolerate  overtly informing stockholders of the possibility in advance of soliciting their in-
vestment, lest by  so doing they alert them to the diversions  to which  it is assumed  they consent,
and thereby discourage investment or raise the cost of capital.  The notion that markets for man-
agers exist  and effect ex post  settlements  sufficiently precisely  to substitute  for  explicit ex  ante
arrangements  is a bold hypothesis--but it is neither self-evident  nor empirically supported.  In-
deed, existing experience and case law suggest that if there is such a market, it is not very effective.
See Vagts, Challenges  to Executive Compensation: For  the Markets orfor  the  Courts?, 8 J. CORP.
LAW  231  (1983).
88.  Apart from any a priori basis for investors expecting the law to require  equal treatment,
there is  no basis  for believing  that investment  advisers  wish to call  such  potential  inequalities
meaningfully to advisees'  attention when recommending investment.  And there is reason  to be-
lieve investors  do not intuitively alert themselves to such matters.  See supra note 39.  Hence,  it is
not inappropriate to require any ambiguities on that score to be cleared up by explicit admonition
to investors  from those soliciting investment.  Tellingly, those in the business  do not seem willing
to  clear up the ambiguity.  Presumably  they  recognize  that adopting  and disclosing  a disparate
sharing rule would raise capital costs and.keep more investors away than would continued silent
reliance upon  the current ambiguous conditions.  See N. BUCHANAN,  supra note  15,  at 458-59.
89.  See Brudney  & Chirelstein, supra note 41,  at  318-19;  Berle, The  Theory of Enterprise
Entity, 47  COLUM.  L. REv.  343, 355-58  (1947).
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by issuing stock of the parent to the minority stockholders  of the sub-
sidiary or stock of a third corporation into which both parent and sub-
sidiary are combined to the stockholders  of each.
To be sure, this still leaves the question whether the price (in new
stock) thus paid for the subsidiary's assets is fair-i.e., results in a sub-
stantively equal division  of the combined  assets  among  all the stock-
holders.  In the  absence of any basis for identifying,  quantifying,  and
compensating for the contribution (or components  of the contribution)
of each company to the combined venture, substantive equality is best
effected by requiring each enterprise to share with the other in the pro-
portion in which each contributes  value to the new venture.  Precisely
such proportionate  sharing underlies the equal treatment of sharehold-
ers on the formation of a corporation.  Each contributing investor par-
ticipates in the enterprise  by receiving stock proportionate  to the value
of his  contribution  to it, but each  receives the  same participation  per
dollar  contributed.  Proportionate  sharing  in  the  parent-subsidiary
merger by the shareholders  of each corporation can be effected in the
same manner.  Each contributing company is allocated  the proportion
of the surviving company's stock which corresponds to the proportion-
ate value  of each  company's contribution  to the combined  enterprise.
This allocation may then be divided equally per share among each cor-
poration's  stockholders.  The  single set of managers  of both ventures
thus  fulfills  its fiduciary  obligations  to each  set of stockholders.  The
managers  do not favor one set of stockholders over the other;  instead,
they treat each set as if they were pooling or combining  assets at arm's
length with the benefit of full information.90
Elsewhere it has been suggested that sharing of the gains from the
merger is a rational expectation of investors and that those gains should
be shared9"  in proportion to the value of each corporation's  contribu-
90.  It has been suggested that the duties of trustees to separate funds are analogous to those
here at issue. See  Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 41,  at 319.  The analogy has been disputed.
See  Lorne, .4 Reappraisal of Fair Shares in Controlled Mergers,  126 U.  PA. L.  REv. 955,  970-83
(1978).  But nothing in the existence  of two  sets of stockholders sharing,  in part, a joint venture
suggests that either set of stockholders does, or should, expect to be required to make sacrifices  in
order to combine with the  other, or mature a corporate opportunity  for both.
91.  Since parent-subsidiary mergers are not exercises in altruism, it is reasonable  to expect
only gains  from the merger.  But it is possible that there may be losses,  and if a loss  results, the
subsidiary should share it unless  the parent is  at fault in determining the contributed  values and
the sharing allocation.  Sharing in proportion to contributions implies that if the combined enter-
prise is worth less than the sum of its parts the subsidiary's stockholders share the loss.  Since the
parent is effecting the merger unilaterally, the question arises whether it should take all the risk of
loss (in which case the sharing formula here presented shortchanges the subsidiary's public stock-
holders) or whether it should bear the loss only if it is at fault--i.e.,  if it is culpably contributing
less in value than it claims credit for contributing, see, e.g.,  Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.  1069  (1978),  but not if its presumably optimistic expectations fail
to materialize for reasons beyond its ken or control.
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tion to the  merger.92  Courts  have  received  the  suggestion  less  than
wholeheartedly.93  And issues have been raised by commentators as to
whether sharing  is necessary  or appropriate,  and if so, how to deter-
mine the value of each  corporation's contribution, and whether to in-
clude any (or what) portion of the gains (or losses) from  combining.94
But that some sharing is,  and ought to be, the rational expectation  of
investors is not seriously questioned.95  To concede that more than one
sharing formula is rationally possible and that each, including the one
previously  suggested,  is  vulnerable  to  criticism,96  neither  precludes
92.  See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 41.
93.  That a parent is required to accord  "fair"  treatment to a subsidiary in a merger  is the
explicit teaching of the courts, in Delaware and elsewhere.  See, e.g., Harman v. Masoneilan Int'l,
Inc.,  442 A.2d  487 (Del.  1982);  cases analyzed id.  And that teaching  is  not  obliterated  by  the
Delphic utterances of the Supreme Court of Delaware  in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,  No, 58 (Del.
Feb.  1, 1983).
While the Delaware courts are less than clear about the meaning of "fair" treatment, there is
no doubt that they contemplate some sort of sharing of the benefits of the merger in cases chal-
lenging parent-subsidiary mergers for "fairness."  Delaware's past refusal to permit the availabil-
ity of the appraisal remedy to preclude  a challenge  for unfairness, see Singer v. Magnavox  Co.,
380 A.2d  969,  977 (Del.  1977);  Roland  Int'l  Corp. v.  Najar, 407  A.2d  1032,  1034  (Del.  1979),
rested  on the  assumption  that the latter  remedy  offered  more  to the  challenger  than  did  ap-
praisal-i.e., an accounting for past misbehavior and a sharing in the benefits of the merger.  See
Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 505 (Del. 1981)  (damage computations);  Harman v.
Masoneilan Int'l, Inc.,  442 A.2d  487,  500 n.23  (Del.  1982)  (same).  See also Gabelli &  Co.,  Inc.
Profit Sharing Plan v. Liggett Group, Inc.,  444 A.2d 261  (Del. Ch.  1982).
To be sure, Weinberger  v. UOP, Inc., No. 58 (Del. Feb. 1, 1983), rejected the teaching that an
action to test fairness of price is not precluded by the existence of the appraisal remedy-at least in
cash-out cases.  But Weinberger contemplates the continued coexistence of both remedies in some
cash-out  cases  ("fraud,  misrepresentation,  self-dealing,  deliberate  waste  of corporate  assets  or
gross and palpable  overreaching")  and possibly even  less restrictedly in  non-cash-out mergers.
More  important,  Weinberger, in "liberalizing"  the relief available under  the appraisal  remedy,
implies  some sort of sharing, but  leaves the matter  frightfully  opaque.  Cf. Dofftemyer  v. W.F.
Hall Printing Co., [Current]  FED.  SEC.  L. REP. (CCH)  99,125  (D. Del. Jan. 28,  1983).  See also
N.Y. Bus. CoP,'.  LAW  § 623(h)(4)  (McKinney  1982).
94.  See, e.g.,  Carney, supra note 42,  at  116;  Easterbrook  &  Fischel, supra note 8;  Lorne,
supra note  90; Toms, Compensating  Shareholders  Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78 COLUM.  L.
Rav. 548  (1978);  Weiss, supra note 41.
95.  Even those who believe that rational investors would consent ex ante to controllers'  ap-
propriation of more than their aliquot share and that an efficient  market determines the  limit of
such appropriation contemplate sharing in some minimum amount of the merger gain.  The objec-
tion to sharing based on the inability to find, or difficulty in applying, an appropriate formula, see
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8,  at 728, cannot justify otherwise  indefensible  allocations of
resources or frustration of investors' expectations unless no tolerable formula is feasible-a condi-
tion which remains  to be demonstrated.
96.  Commentators  have  criticized  the  suggestion  that in  a  parent-subsidiary  merger,  the
merger gains should be shared  in proportion  to the value  that each  corporation's  stockholders
contribute to the merger. See Carneysupra  note 42, at  116 n.188; Lorne,supra  note 90, at 973-83;
Toms, supra note 94, at 569-75.  To the extent that the criticism  is addressed  to the failure of the
formula to require  compensation  for identifiable  costs  or contributions  which can be shown  to
produce specific  increases  or decreases  in  the value  of the combined  enterprise,  it is valid  but
irrelevant.  See id.  at 569-75.  The formula is  directed at the phenomenon  of undisentangleable
consequences  of contributions.  Another valid  but miscast criticism  is that the market prices of
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sharing nor denies the preferability of one formula to others.
Difficulties posed by a payout which is in any form other than the
parent's  or consolidated  company's common  stock, are avoided if that
stock is the currency of the merger.9 7  Payout in the form of its common
stock by the consolidated enterprise conforms  to, and facilitates appli-
cation of, the rule of equal treatment of stockholders.98  In theory, mea-
suring  equality  of  treatment  by  the  proportion  of  the  surviving
company's  common stock distributed to the participants  need not pre-
parent's  and  subsidiary's stocks  is an erroneous  measure  of the contributed  value.  See  Carney,
supra note  42, at  116 n.188.  The criticism  is plausible,  but mistakenly  attributed to the sharing
proposal.  Cf. Brudney & Chirelstein, Corporate  Freezeouts,  Su ra note 41, at 1373 n.35,  1374 n.36
(arguing that reliance on market price of the parent and subsidiary's stock in determining sharing
is misplaced).  Another criticism is that the formula looks only to gains, but fails to take account of
losses.  See  Toms, supra note 94, at 570-71.  But see supra note 91.
A less valid challenge  is addressed to the formula's predicating sharing on the ratio of values
contributed by  parent and subsidiary rather than on other ratios, such  as of assets or sales.  See
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 728; Lome, supra note 90, at 981-82.  But it is the value or
amount contributed by each of the merging enterprises  that is being subjected to the risk of com-
mon stock  ownership in the combined enterprise.  The analogy is to an investor's cash contribu-
tion to a corporation.  Sales or gross assets are totally irrelevant notions.  Returns for the risk thus
taken should be in proportion to the amounts contributed.  All costs and savings are thus lumped
and prorated,  and levels of risk equilibrate in calculating values  contributed.
97.  Some of the criticism of the proposal for sharing is addressed to problems in calculation
and to the impracticality of a payout that is in a form other than the parent's common stock.  See,
e.g.,  Lorne, supra note 90, at 983-87.  For the most part,  as Lorne  recognizes,  those criticisms
become irrelevant when the model contemplates payout in the parent's common stock. Id. at 983.
It is not necessary--either as a matter of efficiency or as a matter of equity-for longtime parents
to be able to freeze  out minority public  holders of subsidiaries for cash or for senior securities.
Merging them out for the parent's common  stock is both appropriate  and lawful.
If the difficulties entailed in cashing them out are not insurmountable,  there is no reason to
require only all-stock mergers.  And at least if the subsidiary's public stockholders are to be given
cash or senior securities in an amount equivalent to the estimated  value of the common stock of
the combined enterprise  to which  they  would be entitled in an all-stock merger,  the difficulties
seem surmountable.  The flaws in market prices, even of the merged  company's stock over a pe-
riod, suggest  that an  "intrinsic"  valuation of the combined enterprise  is  required.  That  such a
process  is  feasible,  albeit not without  a need  for close judicial supervision,  is  suggested by the
valuations  regularly made of the cash values of packages  of securities  offered as the second steps
in tender offers.  On the other hand,  the cost to outsiders and the uncertainties  of reaching such
valuations  in a contested  proceeding would be avoided  by requiring the longtime parent-subsidi-
ary merger to be on an all-stock basis.  That process would also avoid the necessity for determin-
ing the  tax  cost  of a payout  in  cash or senior securities,  for which  the minority is entitled  to
compensation.  See also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del.  1983). Cf.  Toms, supra note
94,  at 575-85  (suggesting a "modified  intrinsic value" approach  which would provide frozen-out
investors  with compensation  for tax and reinvestment  costs).
98.  To be sure, no matter what formula is invoked to determine the division between parent
and subsidiary, formally identical treatment of the subsidiary's stockholders  in dividing its returns
is possible.  But sharing between the two companies by allocating new common stock on the basis
of the proportionate values of their contributions to the combined enterprise most closely matches
the mode  of sharing contemplated  by the initial stock participation in a corporate  venture:  each
shareholer  receives the same participation  per dollar contributed, but the relative  value of the
share received  is determined by the relative value of the contributions made on formation, or on
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elude use of cash or other currency to pay off the public stockholders of
the subsidiary.  So  long as they receive  a quantity of such other cur-
rency that is the effective equivalent of the requisite  common  stock of
the survivor, the principle of equality will be adequately vindicated.  If
practical difficulties in valuation are deemed too costly,
99 neither law"
nor policy need  preclude requiring mergers  of long time parents  and
their subsidiaries to be consummated  only on an all stock basis.
Prescribing  a payoff in common  stock  of the  surviving company
(not to mention cash or senior securities)  does not eliminate  or mini-
mize the difficulties inevitably encountered in valuing the disparate as-
sets which each company contributes to the surviving enterprise.  Since
market prices are not reliable, "intrinsic" valuation is required, with all
the attendant costs and obstacles for those who would challenge  insid-
ers' estimates of the enterprise's expected returns and risk level.  Those
difficulties impede achievement of the desired equality or more than an
approximation of it.'  Eliminating  or reducing them would be facili-
tated  by  adoption  of procedures  utilized  in similar  contexts,  such  as
obtaining assistance of government-appointed  negotiators for the pub-
lic stockholders, the intervention of an administrative  agency, or more
focused and critical judicial scrutiny than courts have given in the past.
D.  Corporate  Purchase  of Its Own Shares
Like a dividend distribution, a corporate purchase of its own stock
is a distribution  of a part of the corporation's  assets to  its stockhold-
ers. 1 0 2  But it is a distribution which differentiates among stockholders.
The sellers  get cash and the surviving stockholders  receive larger pro-
portionate claims to the remaining assets.  As with dividends  or distri-
99.  See supra note 97.
100.  See supra note 69.
101.  It has been suggested that the sharing proposal is defective because it fails to require the
parent to offer the subsidiary to strangers in order to test the propriety of the merger price.  Chirel-
stein, Sargent & Lipton, "Fairness"  in Mergers between Parents  and  Partly-Owned  Subsidiaries, 8
INST.  ON SEC. REG. 273 (1977);  Sf Weiss,supra note 41, at 679-80.  That suggestion, however, goes
to the valuation  process, not  to the sharing  requirement.  To  the  extent  that  the  operating  or
financial synergy resulting from the parent-subsidiary merger might not be available to strangers,
the parent is likely to be able to offer the highest price.  But whether the subsidiary must  be offered
for sale in order to test whether the parent is offering the highest price  is a difficult question.  It is
not, however, the same question as whether a private controller must offer the company for sale or
refrain from going private.  Not only are the social gains from combining public parent and sub-
sidiaries potentially more significant  than those from going private, but because the minority  can
be given the equivalent of continued participation  in the combined venture, there is less need to
force the equivalent of a sale to a stranger.
102.  The Model Business Corporation Act treats the two processes as identical for purposes of
measuring  the  permissibility  of distributions.  See  MODEL  BUSINESS  CORP.  ACT  § 2(i)  (1979);
COMMITTEE  ON  CORPORATE  LAWS,  SECTION  OF  CORPORATION,  BANKING  AND  BUSINESS  LAW,
ABA,  CHANGES  IN  THE  MODEL  BUSINESS  CORPORATION  ACT-AMENDMENTS  TO  FINANCIAL
PROVISIONS  (1979),  reprinted  in 34 Bus. LAW.  1867,  1869 (1979).
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butions in dissolution  it is  theoretically  possible  that the  transaction
treats all stockholders equally in substance, notwithstanding the formal
difference  in treatment.  For instance,  the  amount  paid  per share to
selling stockholders may be equal to the value per share remaining to
the surviving  stockholders  after  repurchase.  Departure  from  formal
equality, however, exposes investors in theory to the possibility, and in
practice to the probability, that different values will be allocated among
shareholders.  The probability of such differential treatment is not less
in the case of stock repurchases than it is in the case of distributions of
different kinds of property as dividends or in the case of dissolution.
A  corporation  may repurchase  its  stock  without  apparently  in-
tending to  convey more  to one  group of its stockholders  than to  an-
other.  Such  "neutral"  corporate  purposes  may  include  partial
liquidation  as  a  result  of contracted  operations, °3  performance  of
household functions,"  or creation of benefits (largely tax) for its stock-
holders. 105  Generally, however, it is the effect, if not the purpose, of the
repurchase  to distribute  more  (or less)  to  one  group  of stockholders
than to another.  Thus repurchase  is,  on occasion, simply an effort to
buy the stock cheaply, either because controllers know favorable corpo-
rate information  not known  to  the market,  or because  management
views  the  stock  as  its  best  investment  opportunity."  On  the  other
hand, it is not unknown for a firm to pay an excessive  amount  (either
above market or above expected market) in order to maintain its stock
price  against intimations of unfavorable  developments, 0 7  to preserve
incumbents'  control,"°' or to bail out insiders.1
0 9
State statutes permit  a corporation to repurchase  its stock at the
103.  Such a repurchase is to be distinguished from going private.  In the latter case, the pur-
pose  is less to contract than to eliminate or significantly reduce the number of  publicly held shares.
Furthermore,  going private transactions  are rarely  even colorably volitional on  the part  of the
sellers.  Cf.  supra note  53.
104.  Repurchase serves to fulfill household functions,  such as eliminating small lots, buying
out retiring  employees  or settling  disputes  over indebtedness.  Cf. MODEL  BUSINESS  CORP.  ACT
§ 6(a)-(d) (1979).
105.  See  Chirelstein, Optional  Redemptions and Optional  Dividends  Taxing the Repurchase of
Common Shares, 78  YALE L.J. 739  (1969).
106.  Brigham, The Profitability  of a Firm's.Purchase of Its Own Stock,  CAL.  Mo~M.  REv.,
Winter  1964,  at 69; cf.  M. Bradley  & L. Wakeman, supra note 28; studies  summarized id.  at 3-6.
107.  The effort may  also be to raise the price of the stock in order  to use  it as currency in
acquisitions  or to induce conversion, see  Davis v. Pennzoil Co., 438 Pa. 194, 264 A.2d 597  (1970).
Or such a premium may result simply because the stock sells on the market at less than the value
management  or the controllers put on it.
108.  See Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d  140 (DeL Ch. 1975); M. Bradley & L. Wake-
man, supra note  28; Brudney, supra note  13;  L. Dann  &  H.  DeAngelo,  Standstill  Agreements,
Privately  Negotiated Stock Purchases and the Market for Corporate  Control (Feb.  1982) (unpub-
lished manuscript forthcoming in volume  11 of the Journal of Financial  Economics).
109.  See, e.g., Bradley & Wakeman, supra note 28; Nussbaum,Acquisition  bya Corporation  of
Its Own Stock, 35  COLuM.  L. Rav. 971,  986 (1935).
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discretion of the directors if the corporation has a source in surplus for
the funds used in the repurchase.' 1 0  Such statutes do not require pro-
rata repurchase.  Federal  securities laws contemplate  repurchases  but
require that the corporation adequately disclose the relevant considera-
tions to the sellers."'  Fiduciary notions in the cases impose both re-
strictions on directors'  discretion and disclosure obligations  in order to
preclude a use of corporate  assets which favors insiders." 2  Implicit in
the cases is the concept that the distribution of corporate assets embod-
ied  in the repurchase  should  not result  in selling  stockholders  being
treated more, or less, favorably than surviving stockholders"  1 3
While the case law thus suggests the principle of equality in sub-
stance, it effectively permits its avoidance in practice.  The considerable
difficulties in establishing what the stock is "worth"  or that the corpo-
rate decision makers are favoring  themselves" 4 have  made the princi-
ple  of  equality  a  porous  protection  for  outsiders.  Fully  effective
application  of the principle in the context  of repurchase  requires  for-
mally  equal treatment-i.e.,  categorically  prohibiting  repurchases  by
110.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,  §§  160,  172,  174, 223  (1974  & Supp.  1982); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW  §§ 513-516,  719  (McKinney  1963  &  Supp.  1982);  see also Martin  v.  American  Potash  &
Chem. Corp., 92 A.2d 295  (Del. 1952);  Snyder v. Memco  Eng'g & Mfg. Co.,  23  A.D.2d 671,  257
N.Y.S.2d 213  (1965).
111.  See Ward  La France Truck Corp.,  13 S.E.C. 373  (1943); Northern  Trust Co. v. Essaness
Theatres  Corp., 103  F. Supp. 954 (N.D.  IlM.  1952); Kennedy, Transactions  by a Corporation  in Its
Own Shares, 19 Bus. LAW. 319 (1964);  Malley, Corporate  Repurchases of  Stock and  the SEC Rules:
An Overview, 29 Bus. LAW.  117 (1973);  17  C.F.R. § 240.13e-4  (1982).  The Investment Company
Act  authorizes restrictions  on repurchase subject to  SEC  permission.  See Investment  Company
Act of 1940 § 23(c),  15  U.S.C. § 80a-23(c) (1976);  17  C.F.R. § 270.23c-1(a) (1982); see also Alnan,
Inc., [Current]  FED.  SEC. L.  REP. (CCH)  1  77,317  (SEC Oct. 6,  1982).
112.  See Brudney, supra note  13; Note, Buying Out Insurgent Shareholders with Corporate
Fund, 70 YALE L.J. 308 (1960);  Wood v. MacLean  Drug Co.,  266 I11.  App. 5  (1932);  MacGill v.
MacGill,  135  Md. 384,  109 A. 72 (1919).
The SEC long called attention to, and sought to restrict the manipulative possibilities gener-
ated by, corporate repurchases.  See Note, Corporate  Stock Repurchases Under the Federal  Securl.
ties Laws, 66 COLUM.  L. Rv. 1292 (1966);  Proposed Rule 13e-2, Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 17,222,  [1980 Transfer Binder]  FED. SEc. L.  RaP. (CCH)  1 82,669  (Oct.  17,  1980);  Securities
Exchange Act Release  No.  19,244,  [1982 Transfer  Binder]  FED.  SEc.  L. REP.  (CCH)  1 83,276
(Nov. 17,  1982); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19,245,  [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.  SEC. L.
RaP. (CCH)  %  83,277 (Nov.  17,  1982).  That the Commission  has withdrawn its proposal to pre-
scribe general antimanipulative  terms  and conditions for  repurchase, in favor  of a safe  harbor
provision, Rule  10b-18; Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19,244,  [1982 Transfer Binder]  FED.
SEc. L. REP.  (CCH)  1  83,276  (Nov.  17,  1982);  Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19,245,  FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH)  1 83,277  (Nov. 17,  1982), reflects the deregulatory market orientation of that
agency.  It does not eliminate management's  temptation to manipulate or the need to proscribe, or
the statutory prohibitions  against, manipulation.
113.  "Favorable"  treatment of controlling  insiders  could  be immediately  economic,  as  in
price advantages  to them  on bailing them  out or on buying  from  outsiders.  Or the  favorable
treatment may be indirect, as in the use of corporate  funds to preserve  their control.  See, e.g.,
Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc.,  347 A.2d  140 (Del.  Ch.  1975); Cheffv. Mathes,  199 A.2d 548 (Del.
1964).
114.  See Brudney, supra note  13, at 272-75.  See also supra note 30.
[Vol. 71:1072 1108EQUAL TREA TMENT OF  SHAREHOLDERS
publicly  held  corporations.  Or,  the  principle  can  be  implemented
somewhat  less  effectively,  but  possibly  at  a  lesser  cost,  by  requiring
prior court or agency approval of the transaction to assure substantive
equality.
To  determine  whether  the  principle  of equality  should  be  thus
more  (or less)  rigidly enforced, it is necessary to consider the advan-
tages  of repurchase  which  are lost  by a  categorical  prohibition,  and
whether obtaining those advantages is worth the cost of the present rule
which  permits  considerable  evasion  of the  substantive  principle  of
equality.
The advantages  claimed for  the firm  or  society from permitting
repurchaseg leave much to be desired as justifications.  That the value
of the enterprise is not augmented by the repurchase is plain.  To char-
acterize  the repurchase  as  a preferred  investment  of corporate  assets
does not mean that such an investment  of funds increases  the profit-
ability or decreases  the risk of the enterprise's operation.  On the con-
trary,  repurchase  disinvests  funds,  and  simply  redistributes  share
ownership in the same productive assets.  Such a result could as easily
have been effected by paying a cash dividend and letting stockholders
sell stock to each other.  To be sure, permitting  repurchase  offers an-
other means to facilitate  distribution, and avoids  management reten-
tion of corporate funds for which investors may find better use.1 5  But
such a purpose is unlikely to be implemented,  particularly by control-
ling stockholders.
The value of permitting  controllers to use corporate  assets to buy
off raiders  has  long  been disputed.  A priori,  such  use  of corporate
funds is likely to benefit neither  society nor incumbent public  stock-
holders.  It is generally not likely to further the best use of corporate
assets.  As has been noted, permitting management to buy off raiders,
even in those  cases  in which it  is claimed  to be the  best  use of the
corporation's  assets (i.e., to avert a takeover by a less efficient or more
corrupt  controller)  involves  policing  costs  and  an  indeterminate
number of evasions that can easily outweigh the occasional benefit.
16
Permitting controlling stockholders to buy off raiders implicates a more
certain net cost.
The tax advantage  to stockholders  of a repurchase  instead  of a
dividend does not augment the corporation's wealth.  At best, if trans-
fer payments were possible, or if the corporate management attempted
to fix a repurchase price that required sellers to share their tax advan-
tage to some extent with the nonselling stockholders, there would be no
115.  See supra note 53.
116.  See Brudney, supra note  13.
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increase in the productive wealth of the society attributable to the real
assets in corporate solution.  The enhancement of corporate  wealth by
a repurchase  price that  reflects  a give-up  by  sellers  of some  of their
income tax  advantage  is simply  a  transfer  payment  to the  surviving
stockholders, who ultimately will pay their tax if they obtain the trans-
fer  payment  individually  by  dividend,  liquidation,  or  sale  of stock.
And the difficulty in determining the appropriate amount of such trans-
fer payments suggests that there would inevitably be inequality in shar-
ing  the  sum of the  surviving  stockholders'  price  advantage  and  the
seller's tax  advantage.
It has been suggested  that stock repurchase  transactions  enhance
the pricing  efficiency  of the market,  and presumably  cogrgte  capital
allocational  efficiency." 7  If initiated by management in the lbsence of
controlling  stockholders,  such transactions  escape  many of the  objec-
tions of insider  trading.  Even  if management  repurchases  in a  bona
fide effort to raise prices, however, there is reason to question whether
either  allocational  or  market  efficiency  would  be  enhanced."'  But
117.  See  Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23  VAND.  L.  REV.  547,  565-66
(1970);  Demsetz, Pefect Competition, Regulation, and the Stock Market, in  ECONOMIC  POLICY
AND  THE REGULATION  OF CORPORATE SECURITIES  1, 14 (H.  Manne ed. 1969); W. BAUMOL,  THE
STOCK MARKET  AND  ECONOMIC  EFFICIENCY 63 (1965).  But cf. Berle, The Impact of the Corpora.
don on  Classical  Economic Theory, 79 QJ. ECON. 25  (1965)  (suggesting the  diminishing  impor-
tance of the securities market as a source of risk capital).
118.  Arguably, a management which "believes"  price is lower than "true"  value but is unable
to persuade the market to equalize the two  (notwithstanding the fullest feasible disclosure  of all
relevant corporate information) will,  by judicious repurchasing, bring  price closer into  line with
value sooner than would otherwise occur in a market unstimulated  by such repurchasing.  Some
doubt  is  cast  upon  that  argument,  however,  by  the suggestion  that  the  market  falls  after the
repuchase  program stops.  See Hetherington, supra note 9, at 236 n.169.
In theory, market price reflects  the bids and asks of rational, willing  buyers and sellers who
bring to bear on the transactions their judgment about the value of the particular stock in compar-
ison with other trading or investment opportunities.  When  the corporation  buys its own stock it
may, as a formal matter, be making a similar judgment-it is better to invest in its own stock than
in some other asset.  However,  notwithstanding the social values claimed for use of inside infor-
mation, see H.  MANNE,  INSIDER  TRAINING  AND  THE  STOCK  MARKET  (1966),  to  allow  market
price to be set by corporate purchases can have significant  distorting effects on prices presumably
set in a free market. See Halsey, Stuart & Co., 30 S.E.C.  106,  112 (1949).  Those purchases inject
variables not generally  associated  with the market's  pricing function  or the opportunity  sets of
outside buyers.  If the variable is hard "inside"  information, management  ought to disclose it in
the interest  both of market efficiency  and its obligation  to all the  firm's stockholders.
A more complex problem is presented if it is "soft"  undisclosable (because too indeterminate)
information combined with managerial judgment which the market contemporaneously does not
share.  It is reasonable  to suppose  that in such circumstances  management has a favorable  bias
about the future which a more objective market does not share at the time and often will not share
when the future arrives.  Such corporate repurchase creates a more or less systematic likelihood of
later market disagreement  with management's earlier judgment.  No social gain follows  from the
process.  All that is involved is favoring one group of stockholders  over another-unless the mar-
ket's pricing function  is enhanced.
The question is not merely whether the direction of the price movement which management's
repurchase  will effect  is more likely to be right than  wrong in view of management's bias.  It is
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when controlling stockholders initiate a repurchase transaction, the ob-
jections to insider trading apply with comparable force. 119  Hence, the
value of such transactions for the pricing efficiency  of the market must
be weighed against both the impediments they may create to achieving
that goal and the cost of permitting diversion  of values to insiders.
20
If repurchases  provide no enhancement  of corporate  wealth  and
little  enhancement  of market  efficiency,  the  only  other  value  to be
weighed  in assessing  a rule precluding,  or requiring approval  for, re-
purchase  is the availability to investors of a choice to retain or to  sell
the stock at what they consider advantageous  prices.' 2 1  There is room
to argue,  even in a context in which management  is not dominated  by
any shareholder  group, that the  rule of equal treatment,  or manage-
ment's duty to all stockholders, cannot be satisfied by the offer of such
a choice. 22  But even if it can, the value thus urged-both for sellers
and for those who remain stockholders' 2 -turns  on whether the choice
whether,  in view  of the  magnitude of the  induced movement,  the direction  is likely  to be  right
sufficiently  more often than the market would be if it had all the information  which management
is unable to disclose at the time of repurchase.  In light of other, corrupt as well as biased, factors
that allowing repurchase introduces, it is not irrational to prefer market determination of price on
the  best disclosure management  can make  to a price influenced  by managerial  use of corporate
cash.
119.  Controlling  stockholders  have  reason  to withhold disclosable  information  in order to
induce bargain purchases by the corporation.  The limits of the law requiring disclosure import a
wide margin for such withholding.  If, as is probable, controllers utilize that margin fully, market
price may be less accurate under a regime permitting repurchase  (with its incentive to withhold
information)  than  under  a  regime  forbidding  repurchase,  at least  for  firms  with  controlling
stockholders.
120.  The signalling effect of repurchases  is both less communicative  and more confusing than
the signalling effect of dividends.  See Asquith & Mullins, The Impact of  Initiating  Dividend Pay-
ments on Shareholders' Wealth, 56 J. Bus. 77 (1983);  Dann, supra note 28; Vermaelen, supra note
28.
121.  Cf
. supra note 50.
122.  See Brudney, Going  Private,  supra note 52, at  1046-48.  The propriety of requiring stock-
holders  to choose  between  remaining  and selling when management  proposes an  investment  in
new assets  does not demonstrate the propriety of forcing a choice  between remaining and selling
when  the "investment"  which  management  makes  is in its own stock.  The possibility  of social
gain in the former is  wholly lacking in the latter.
123.  It has been suggested that if stockholders were separable into (1) investors who invest on
long-term expectations and trade in the short term only in response to unexpected personal needs,
and (2) speculators, short-sellers  and arbitrageurs who trade primarily in response to price move-
ments, Shonfield, Business in the Twenty-First Century, 98 DAEDALUS  191,  201  (1969); see also H.
MANNE,  supra note  118,  at 94-96, the former are systematically likely to benefit, and the latter to
lose more or less randomly, from corporate repurchase on favorable inside information.  See H.
Tobin,  Should Corporations  Be Permitted To Purchase Their Own Shares?  31-35  (1980)  (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with the Caif/ornia  Law Review).  The total number of shareholders  will
thus gain  (if short sellers are not considered  shareholders) and long-term  investors  will be pre-
ferred  over short-term traders.  Whether long-term investors are more deserving than short-term
traders, or whether any such distinction among investors would justify departure from the rule of
equal treatment--as a matter of efficiency or as a matter of expectations or equity-requires fur-
ther  inquiry.  But given a model with a controlling group  of stockholders,  the likelihood of per-CALIFORArIA LAW REVIEW
offered is volitional or is skewed against the outsider.
The volitional  character  of the  repurchase  transaction  is not  al-
ways clear.  When insiders'  shares are being bought the transaction  is
effectively  unilateral  and no volition  by outsiders  is involved.  When
outsiders'  shares are being bought, the volitional character  of the sell-
ers' acts depends upon how well informed they are or how coercive the
tender  offer  is.  Hence,  formally  expanding  the  choices  available  to
stockholders by permitting offers to repurchase is not always preferable
to precluding  that choice.  Expansion  of opportunities for choice  is an
independent  good  only if the  choice  is  not confined  to a  context  in
which it is more probable (rather than less probable) that the noncon-
trolling seller or buyer will be a loser-i.e., will sell at less, or effectively
buy at more, than the value of the stock.  If there is a systematically
higher probability that the outsider will lose rather than gain, offering
the choice is not a good to be encouraged, unless the probabilities  are
adequately  explained.
Avoidance  of such  a  systematically  skewed  choice  requires  ade-
quate  disclosure  of relevant  information.  But  fulfillment  of that re-
quirement is difficult even in the best of circumstances-i.e., where self-
interest does not distort the controller's  decision  to repurchase  or the
completeness  of the  inside information distributed  to the  outsider.1 24
Given such self-interest, normal "fraud" law, including Rule 1Ob-5,  of-
fers  only modest  help.125   Sellers  are  systematically  likely  to  be  de-
prived  of the  opportunity  to  make  an  adequately  informed  choice.
Whether or not pressure to disclose such information will result in any
significant cost to the corporation, 126 added costs to investors will result
from efforts to enforce production and communication of such ambigu-
ous information.
The question  is whether it is worth exposing all stockholders  and
society to the information disadvantage or to those costs in order possi-
bly to reduce some stockholders' personal income tax by an ambiguous
tax avoidance device'27  or to give them the  opportunity to sell stock to
sonal gain to them from use of inside information  sets up a different equation than that applicable
to repurchase by  a relatively disinterested management.
124.  See Brudney, supra note 52, at 1046-48.  Insiders will  rationally decline the risk of being
found  liable for  erroneously  making the estimates or projections which are necessary  to be  re-
vealed in order to make adequate  disclosure.
125.  Even federal disclosure  requirements  for issuer tender offers, see  17  C.F.R. § 240.13e-4
(1982),  leave room for controllers to enjoy  "play" in the use of inside information.  But cf.  supra
note 28.
126.  Compare Brudney, Dividends, Discretion, and Disclosure, 66  VA.  L.  REv.  85,  116-18
(1980)  (examining appropriate  disclosure requirements for dividend distributions),  with  Fischel,
The Law and  Economics of Dividend  Policy, 67  VA.  L. REv.  699, 717-25  (1981)  (arguing against
mandatory disclosure of information  regarding dividend policy).
127.  Whether a repurchase (in preference to a dividend) motivated solely or even principally
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the company at prices  above market.  Even in the case of a manage-
ment not  subject  to  dominant  stockholders,  repurchase  is sufficiently
difficult to monitor and insufficiently valuable to society to raise doubts
that its  benefits  to some  stockholders  are worth  its probable  costs to
others.128  But if the likely presence of market imperfections (i.e., inside
information  or  manipulated  prices)  is  coupled  with  the  controllers'
temptation  to  create  or  exploit those imperfections,  the matter  is less
doubtful.  In those circumstances,  the costs of a rule under which con-
trollers can-and in their own interest will seek to-benefit themselves
at the  expense of outsiders,  weigh more  heavily against  the personal
cost to outsiders of a categorical prohibition  or a rule requiring prior
court approval.
In sum, for corporations  having controlling stockholders, there is
good reason  to adopt a categorical  prohibition against  most 129 repur-
chases.13  And for  repurchases  by large public  corporations  without
controlling  stockholders there is reason to consider at least a require-
ment of prior approval  by the courts or an administrative  agency.3
Comparable restrictions in other countries with modem industrial and
financial institutions suggest that such restrictions are not incompatible
with a feasible corporate jurisprudence. 1 32
by the expected tax consequences to the stockholders is, or should be, allowed to produce capital
gain treatment is a nice question.  See Bacon, Share  Redemptions by Publicly Held Companies: A
New Look at Dividend  Equivalence, 26 TAX  L. Rav. 283  (1971);  Chirelstein, supra note  105.
128.  But cf. supra note  123.
129.  Exceptions  are  needed  for  close  corporations  and  for  repurchases:  for  household
cleanup, such  as eliminating  fractional shares or reducing odd  lots, see Securities Exchange  Act
Release No. 19,246,  [1982 Transfer Binder]  FED. SEC.  L. REP. (CCH) T  83,278 (Nov. 17,  1982),  or
in special  contexts  from  particular  persons,  such  as  debtors  who are  compromising or paying
debts,  dissenters in appraisals, or retiring employees.
130.  It does not alter the conclusion urged in the text that controllers may, subject to fiduciary
and disclosure obligations, use their own funds to purchase  corporate stock.  Different considera-
tions of social utility weigh the balance against a categorical prohibition of personal purchase by
controllers.  See Brudney, Going Private,  supra note 52, at  1053-54.
131.  The difficulty in determining whether a controlling group exists is relevant  to whether to
invoke only the less rigorous remedy. That difficulty may justify imposing the broader prohibition
in all cases rather than merely where a controlling group exists.
132.  English law has recently moved from prohibition of repurchase without court approval,
see  L.  GOWER, supra note 37, at 225-28  (4th ed.  1969  & Supp.  1981),  to permitting  repurchase
under restricted conditions, see  DEPARTMENT  OF TRADE,  THE PURCHASE  BY  A  COMPANY  OF ITS
OwN SHARES  (1980)  (Cmnd. 7944); Companies Act of 1981,  ch. 62,  §§ 46-48.  Other countries still
retain  the  prohibition.  See H. FORD,  PRINCIPLES  OF COMPANY  LAW  162-64  (1974)  (Australia).
Cf. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 23(c),  15  U.S.C.  § 80a-23(c) (1981);  17 C.F.R. § 270.23c-
l(a) (1981)  (authorizing restrictions on repurchase subject to SEC permission).  In Western Euro-
pean  countries, corporate purchase  of shares is  governed by somewhat  less rigorous restrictions.
These range from a flat prohibition against such purchase without court approval to prohibitions
with increasingly  broad exceptions.  See E.  STEIN,  HARMONIZATION  OF  EUROPEAN  COMPANY
Laws  322-25  (1971);  COMPANY  LAW  IN  EUROPE 94-95  (S. Frommel & J. Thompson  eds.  1975)
(Belgium); id at  158 (Denmark); id at  198 (France); id at 276 (Ireland); id at 396 (Netherlands);
id at 564-65 (United Kingdom); id at 309  (Italy).  A flat prohibition has been proposed for Euro-
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E.  Summary
If we distance ourselves from particular types of transactions,  and
look at the general pattern of the transactions,  we see that all involve
essentially unilateral action by controllers who are tempted and able to
take more  than their  aliquot shares  of the firm at the expense  of the
minority.  Since third parties are not involved in bidding, they are not
available to set a floor  or indeed a fair value for the prices at which
minorities  are expropriated.  And the susceptibility of market price to
controller manipulation in anticipation of the transactions  makes that
price ineffectual to assure the minority a floor that will leave them "no
worse off."  There is thus no reason for the minority to consent to such
arrangements--ex  ante  or otherwise.  Any rule authorizing  them will
substantially  increase  the  cost  of inducing  public investment.  More-
over,  a rule of unequal treatment  offers  controllers  the temptation  to
engage in wasteful transactions solely for the purpose of realizing per-
sonal gains.
What reason, therefore, justifies  a rule allowing controllers  to di-
vert any part of the minority's aliquot  share to themselves?  Since  the
transactions are entirely internal reshuffles, no gain from new contribu-
tions-tangible  or intangible-from third  parties  enters into the cost-
benefit  calculations.  Self-generated  increases in value claimed for the
enterprise, even if occasionally  substantial, will normally be less than
would be expected  from third-party intervention.  And little, if any, of
those gains can be shown to require disparate division of assets in order
to obtain controllers' consents.  In an internal rearrangement, the con-
trollers' knowledge of the relevant facts reduces the likelihood that the
process of seeking such gains necessitates the incentive of disparate di-
vision  as  a means  to  compensate  controllers  for  special  costs  or un-
shared risks from the transactions.  Hence a rule of unequal treatment
provides no apparent  social advantage.  The claim for net gains from
such  a rule  rests  on tidy assumptions  which ignore  institutional  fric-
tions and market imperfections.
If, as  appears  likely,  investors have  reason to expect equal treat-
ment in distributions  or reorganizations which  are simply  internal re-
shuffles,  it  would  take  a  powerful  case  of net  social  gain to justify
denying  such treatment.  Indeed, even  if investors  have no reason  to
expect unequal treatment, nothing short of an explicit  warning of that
risk in advance of investment would justify exposing them to it.
pean  Companies  by  the Commission  of the  European  Communities.  See  COMMISSION  OF  TIlE
EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES,  PROPOSAL  FOR A  COUNCIL REGULATION  EMBODYING  A STATUTE  FOR
EUROPEAN  COMPANIES  art. 46  (1970),  reprinted  in 3  BULL.  EUR.  COMMUNITIES  Supp. at 44.  Cf
Department of Trade, supra, at 6-8.
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II
THIRD  PARTY  TRANSACTIONS
A.  Arm's-length Mergers
In the case of arm's-length mergers, in contrast to parent-subsidi-
ary mergers, the problem centers less upon the price paid by the acquir-
ing  company  than  upon  equality  in  distribution  among  the
shareholders of the company being merged out.  But price is not irrele-
vant in considering the problem of equality.  If assuring the division of
an  otherwise  fixed  purchase  price  were  the  only  consideration  gov-
erning the application of the equal treatment principle in the context of
arm's-length mergers, there would be no more reason to dilute the prin-
ciple in that context than in the dividend or liquidation context.  But to
some extent, the purchase price and the consummation of some merg-
ers may be affected by enforcement of a rule of equal treatment.  From
the minority stockholder's  point of view, the question is whether he is
likely to fare  better if the law assumes,  or indeed permits, dispropor-
tionate  sharing  of the purchase  price than if it does  not.  And  from
society's  point of view, the  question  is whether  such  a rule  is  more
likely to effect optimal allocation of resources-i.e., transfer of property
to more productive uses-than a rule of equal treatment.
The problem of disproportionate  distribution of the merger pro-
ceeds  among stockholders  is not significant in negotiated mergers  be-
tween  corporations  not  having  controlling  stockholders  and  where
neither  corporation  solicits  purchases  of the  other's  stock.  In  such
cases, any problem of impropriety  in the distribution of the purchase
price derives largely from side payments to management.  But the pro-
priety of the distribution of merger proceeds to stockholders frequently
arises (1) in negotiated transactions where the acquired corporation has
controlling stockholders;  and (2) in two-step mergers where the acquir-
ing corporation starts by seeking from the public a control block of the
target's  stock.
L  Mergers  After Negotiated  Sales by Controllers
The essential  objection  to  the rule  of equality  in the  case of an
arm's-length  merger is that it creates  the possibility that buyers  must
pay more  for 100% of the assets than a disproportionate  sharing  rule
would require. And to the extent that the buyer must pay more, a cer-
tain number of desirable acquisitions  will be inhibited--to  the disad-
vantage  of minority stockholders  and society generally.  This may be
illustrated by an enterprise that has  1000 shares  outstanding in which
Mr. X owns  501  shares.  Its shares are selling  at $20 per share, and a
buyer with a better use for the business wishes  to pay $22,000 for the
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entire enterprise.  A premium of $2 per share to each stockholder is not
enough, however, to induce Mr. X to sell to the buyer.  The buyer can
offer $22,000 and the majority can keep $11,773.50  (a $3.50  premium)
and force the minority to  accept  approximately  $20.50 per share.  Or
the buyer can offer to pay the controller  $23.50 for his shares  and the
$20.50 for each of the minority's  shares which  the controller  acquires
from the minority.  If the buyer does not wish to pay more than $22,000
and the rule of equality  applies, the transaction  will not be  consum-
mated and both society and the minority will be the losers.
As in the case of parent-subsidiary  mergers, it is said that in order
most  efficiently  to  encourage  and  effect  the  gains  from  such  arm's-
length mergers,  governing  law should permit the seller's stockholders,
at the discretion of the seller's controllers,  to share disproportionately
in the proceeds but on a "no worse ofi"  basis.133  Central to that pre-
scription is the suggestion that ex ante rational investors should consent
to such disparate treatment.
That suggestion  is somewhat,  but not much,  more persuasive  in
the arm's-length  context than  it was in the parent-subsidiary  context.
Market imperfections  that create prices  favoring  insiders  in anticipa-
tion of a merger may not be so frequent or so significant in the case of
arm's-length  mergers  as  in  the  case  of  parent-subsidiary  mergers.
Some such imperfections are not unlikely, however.  Controllers' efforts
to raise, or keep, a market price up to full value can  be muted if they
perceive an advantage to themselves in doing otherwise.  Therefore, to
some indeterminate  extent, a rule of disparate sharing would produce
not merely an unequal allocation of the merger's gains, but also actual
losses for minority stockholders.
If investors understand the full import of the possibility of unequal
treatment,  they  will  increase their price  for  the  initial investment  . 34
Moreover, to the extent that at any given time public investors must be
concerned  about  whether  controllers  contemplating  purchase  of mi-
nority shares are holding down the market price of the stock in antici-
pation of a sale of all of the assets, a rule of disparate distribution adds
a further  cost.  Buyers and sellers will face a market  price which is  in
part a function of a discount for risks which do not enter into the pres-
ent value of the corporate earnings  stream.  Market prices will, there-
133.  That position implies that it is permissible for the controllers to buy up the  noncontrol-
lers'  stock  at  the  prevailing  market price,  notwithstanding  the  controllers'  "inside"  knowledge
(and the noncontrollers'  ignorance) of a higher offered  price.
134.  In theory, that increase in the cost of capital can be avoided or reduced by diversifica-
tion.  But in  a less  than perfect world,  adequate  diversification  by investors is  not achieved  by
many investors, and in enterprises which are, or become subject to, a private control group, it will
not occur costlessly.  See supra note 27; text accompanying notes 81-84.  But ef. Toms, supra note
94, at 560-64  (distinguishing the case of two-step  acquisitions initiated  by a sale of control).
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fore,  be  distorted  unnecessarily,  unless  imposing  those  risks  and
distortions is necessary to achieve a social gain which  offsets the costs.
In general, the gains from arm's-length mergers should rationally
be  more  substantial  than the  gains  from  longtime  parent-subsidiary
mergers.  While the latter simply amalgamate existing joint enterprises,
the former embody potential contributions and new uses contemplated
by strangers.135  But, not all the gains associated with such mergers de-
pend upon allowing diversions to controllers.  Assessing the gains that
would occur if controllers  had a right to divert depends  upon tenuous
inferences about the incentives necessary to induce wealth-maximizing
decisions.  Even without a rule of disparate treatment, controllers  will
sell out to "better"  users if the buyers offer enough.  The $2 premium
per share  which the buyer  offers  for  100% of the stock  will  often  be
sufficient  for the controller if he is bound  by a rule of equality.  The
uncertain dimensions  of the expected  gains from the merger challenge
the  necessity  for fashioning  legal norms  so  to encourage  controllers'
acquisitive behavior in an untidy world in which investors can ration-
ally expect not merely deprivation of gains but actual losses.
There  is not significantly  more reason  to think  investors  should
prefer a  rule of disparate  treatment  in arm's-length  mergers  than in
parent-subsidiary  mergers or going private transactions.'36  And there
certainly is no more reason to think that they do expect or prefer such
open ended disparate treatment.  In the absence of a basis for believing
that investors expect such unequal treatment, equity requires a rule of
equal treatment137-particularly  for the majority of individual inves-
tors who are not adequately diversified.
13
Enforcement  of substantive  equality  would  be  significantly  en-
hanced by a requirement of formally identical treatment.  It is difficult
to see any benefits to the acquiring corporation from enabling it to allot
different currencies to different  stockholders of the acquired  corpora-
tion.139  The acquiring  corporation's  only productive  reason to pay in
135.  To the extent that acquirers in arm's-length mergers proceed on less information than do
parents,  they  are more  likely  to "over  pay,"  but presumably  that  uncertainty enters  into their
determination of price.  However,  the market may not police acquirers  so closely that their man-
agers'  aggrandizement can be said to be irrelevant  in assessing the social value of the transactions.
See Marris & Mueller, The Corporation, Competition, andthe Invisible Hand, 18 J. ECON. LITERA-
TURE  32, 40-45  (1980);  Note, The Conflict Between  Managers and Shareholders in Diversfying.4c-
quisitions, 88  YALE L.J.  1238  (1979); see also  M. Jensen & R. Ruback, supra note 77, at 2-20.
136.  See supra  notes 49 & 66.
137.  See supra  text accompanying notes 34-39.
138.  See supra note 81.
139.  From the point of view of the acquired corporation's  stockholders, it is hard to find any
reason to permit differential treatment among them in the terms of the merger.  If the merger is an
all stock merger and some stockholders want cash, they may effect that result by selling the stock
of the acquiring company on the market.  If cash is the merger currency, it can be used to buy the
acquirer's stock.  In either case, uniformity of treatment is effected in the merger itself. If the sales
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different currencies  is that it needs or prefers to do so in  order to  ac-
quire the services of either stockholding management or controllers  of
the acquired corporation.  But that purpose can be fully met by making
the side payments explicit, identifying the amounts and the services or
other goods acquired, and justifying the extra payments  as such.'
40
If the principle  of equality  demands  distribution  of an identical
form of currency to each stockholder of the acquired corporation, noth-
ing in the governing  law precludes  it.  The fact that the statutes in  all
states contemplate payment of cash or other kinds  of property  (bonds,
preferred stock or real assets) to the stockholders  of an acquired com-
pany141 does not mean that they  contemplate  differential payments to
the acquired company's  minority stockholders.  The statutes  were  en-
acted to facilitate mergers by permitting an acquiring company to pay
in a currency other than its own common stock.142  For many purposes,
it may be desirable to use bonds or cash to eliminate all the stockhold-
ers of the old company.  It does not follow from the need for such flex-
ibility that there is a need to differentiate among the stockholders of the
acquired company.  The statutory language is met if all members of the
class are required to accept, and an acquiring corporation is required to
pay them, the same form of currency.
143
2  Two-step Takeovers
The problem  of equality  of treatment  in a merger,  which  is the
second step after a successful tender offer for control, is somewhat dif-
or purchases  impose intolerable or undesirable additional costs upon the public stockholders  of
the merged enterprise,  the acquiring  company may offer them the option to take  either stock  or
cash  as they choose.  But to  offer  individuals the option of selecting different  forms of payment
presents none of the objections applicable  to compelled receipt of different forms of payment.
140.  If the value of the common  assets is affected by the continuance of the services  rendered
by  the controlling shareholder,  the problem  of disentangling the value of the controlling  stock-
holder's continued services from the value of the enterprise without them (which is the only value
on which the minority has equal claims) is not solved by the form of currency used.  Nor does the
form of currency used avoid the possibility of thus creating a screen which conceals disproportion-
ate payments  extracted  by  the refusal  of the controlling  stockholder  to  consent  to the  merger
unless thus bribed.  But while both those problems present difficulties for administering the rule of
equality in sharing the proceeds of the merger, neither  requires  or justifies departure from  that
rule in substance.
141.  See, eg.,  MODEL  BUSINESS  CoRP. ACT § 71(c)  (1979).
142.  See  Weiss, supra note  41,  at 632-41;  Brudney,  Going Private, supra note  52,  at  1028;
Greene, supra note 42, at 489 n.7.
143.  It does not detract from this conclusion that the same statutory language when invoked
in the  context of parent-subsidiary  mergers permits  formally different  treatment of parent and
public stockholders.  In that context, the parent as stockholder of the subsidiary is, by definition,
acquiring the assets of the subsidiary and the public stockholders of the subsidiary are, by defini-
tion, acquiring either  stock of the parent or other currency.  Such differentiation  is unavoidable.
See supra note 69.  But the inevitability of differentation  in parent-subsidiary  mergers  does not
require  or support differentiation  in the distribution of the proceeds  of single-step arm's-length
mergers among the  acquired company's stockholders.
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ferent from the problems encountered in either longtime parent-subsid-
iary  or  negotiated  arm's-length  mergers."4  The  purpose  of equal
treatment  of the target's  stockholders  in two-step  takeovers  is not so
much to avert  unequal division between  public investors and the tar-
get's  controllers  (since by  assumption  there are no controllers)  but to
prevent the bidder from taking advantage  of the power of a single  of-
feror  to whipsaw  dispersed  offerees.  The question is whether to allow
the bidder to pay less in the coerced second step even though doing so
restricts, or indeed denies, the free choice investors are assumed to, and
led to believe they do,  have in the first step.
It has been urged'45 that the costs of a rule of equality in two-step
takeover transactions outweigh its gains.  The argument is that a rule of
equality  would increase  the cost of, and hence discourage  some, take-
overs.  To the extent that the principle of equality encourages holdouts
in response  to the tender offer, it will make the takeover less likely to
succeed and more costly.  Two undesirable consequences follow.  More
productive  use of assets by the acquirer  is impeded,  and the discipli-
nary effect of the takeover market is diminished.  Moreover, since pre-
miums  are  always  paid  on  takeovers  (in  anticipation  of  more
productive use of assets), to discourage takeovers is to make all public
investors  in potential targets poorer.
The opposing  argument  is that even  if takeovers  enhance  social
utility to  some  disputed  extent,  the costs of allowing  the acquirer to
coerce shareholders  into yielding their property  are too high.  Argua-
bly, the dispersed stockholders are paid less in the takeover than a sin-
gle knowledgeable  seller would be willing to accept. 46  Since dispersed
shareholders lack the bargaining capacity of a single owner of a major-
ity of the stock, the bidder's price  is likely to be less than the "ideal"
market price.'47  To permit the  price  in the second  step  merger  of a
unitary  transaction  to be lower than the tender price is to further re-
duce the sellers'  price option.
The positive  attraction of the bid price is the normal inducement
144..  No functional bright line can be drawn to offer an easy operational distinction between a
merger'contemplated  as a second step at the time control was acquired and a merger which was
not so contemplated but is stimulated by events after the acquisition of control. A rule of thumb is
feasible, however. See Brudney & Chirelstein, Mergers  and  Takeovers, supra note 41,  at 340 n.87.
For analytic purposes we may treat the former as a unitary transaction quite distinct in kind and
in appropriate  consequences  from the latter.
145.  See, e.g.,  Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 66.
146.  See  Lowenstein, supra note 27; Toms, supra note 94.
147.  Two-step  tender  offers  and negotiated  mergers  represent  fundamentally  different  bar-
gaining processes.  See Brudney & Chirelstein, Mergers  and  Takeovers, supra note 41,  at 340 n.89;
Brudney & Chirelstein, Corporate  Freezeouts, supra note 41, at 1363-64 n.18; Toms, supra note 94,
at 554-60.
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to a seller.  If the bid price is not high enough to induce  a majority of
investors  to accept it without the pressure of the threat of a later  co-
erced lower price, then it is likely to be less than a seller acting for the
entire constituency would accept. 148  If stocks of publicly held corpora-
tions sell on the market at less than would  100% of the stock of a pri-
vate corporation, it is presumably in part because of agency costs.  To
press -a takeover  bidder  to  offer  a price  approaching  what  a  private
owner would  hold out for
14 9  is to seek to allocate  to public investors
some but not all of the savings in agency costs which the bidder thinks
it can effect.  A rule allowing public investors to be whipsawed exposes
them to denial of any part of the savings of agency costs; it thus penal-
izes them in the name of a claimed  (but hardly demonstrated)1 5 0  effort
to reduce those agency costs for all investors.
It is not clear whether that whipsaw pressure, and consequent dim-
inution of dispersed  shareholders'  bargaining power,  creates a cost to
society greater  than the benefit of allowing  a cheaper takeover price,
more frequent takeovers, and the claimed closer monitoring of agency
costs.  The benefits are, a priori, more problematic than the costs.  That
the increase in the cost of capital resulting from such a takeover regime
could be reduced by diversification does not eliminate the problem,  at
least  for the many  investors  who  in fact  are not diversified 5'-even
148.  Takeovers  opposed by  management  produce  higher prices  than  unopposed  takeovers.
See Gilson,  A Structural  Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender
Offers, 33  STAN.  L. REv. 819,  868 (1981).  See also Carney, supra note 42, at  112-18 (suggesting
possibility of loss to aggregate of target shareholders from price of successful bid for 51%); S. Linn
& J. McConnell, An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of the Antitakeover  Amendments  on
Common  Stock Prices,  (June  1982)  (unpublished manuscript  forthcoming  in volume  II of the
JournalofFinancialEconomics);  H. DeAngelo & E. Rice, Antitakeover  Charter Amendments  and
Stockholder Wealth (June 1982) (unpublished manuscript forthcoming in volume  11 of the Jour-
nal of Financial  Economics).
149.  See Bebchuk, supra note 82,  at 48-49; Lowenstein, supra note 27.
150.  See Lowenstein, supra note 27; Gilson, supra note 148,  at 870-75.  The sizes of the premi-
ums offered  on takeover  bids prior to the impact of the Williams  Act suggest rather  substantial
agency slack in target companies.  Possibly all, or even more than all, of the increase in the size of
the premiums after the Act, see P. Asquith, R. Bruner & D. Mullins, The Gains to Bidding Firms
from  Merger  (Nov.  1982)  (unpublished manuscript forthcoming  in volume  11  of the Journal  of
Financial  Economics), is attributable to the impediments generated by governmental  intervention
and  by new  defensive  tactics.  But  the notion that the  threat of takeover  significantly  reduces
agency  costs is  not self-evident.  In  the  absence  of evidence  showing  that premiums have  con-
tracted despite the volume of takeovers during the past 15 years, particularly during the last seven
or eight years of the takeover movement (i.e., since the bulk of the governmental  intervention has
become effective), the salutary effect of the takeover movement on reducing agency slack remains
uncertain and undemonstrated--and so do the cost-benefit conclusions of the protagonists  of com-
pelled passive responses by target managements  to takeover bids.  Doubts about the validity of the
notion that "better" uses systematically displace  "worse"  uses in takeovers are not allayed by the
recurrence  of takeovers like the U.S. Steel  acquisition of Marathon  Oil or the Martin-Marietta,
Bendix, Allied fiasco.  See N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1982, at 37, col.  1; Lowenstein, supra note 27,  at
289-94.
151.  See supra text accompanying notes 69-89.
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assuming it is appropriate to fashion legal rules that penalize failure to
diversify against such contingencies.
Nor  would  a  rule  of equality  impose  undue  costs  on investors,
notwithstanding the claim that potential tenderers  will lose opportuni-
ties for premiums because  a rule of equality will discourage tender of-
fers.  The  cost of that loss must be  assessed  against  the amounts  lost
(i.e.,  the  difference  between  tender price  and merger price) by those
who  fail to  tender under  a rule which  permits  disparate  payment.152
Those lost amounts may be lessened, but will not be eliminated, if the
merger price exceeds the pre-tender-offer  price,  as it is said inevitably
to do.  In any event,  it is not clear why  an investor would rationally
consent to invest under a legal arrangement permitting such a whipsaw,
even with a pre-tender-offer  floor, if he were given the opportunity to
accept  a  rule  of equality-notwithstanding  that the  rule  of equality
might produce  fewer tenders  at prices that were  uniform  as between
each of the two steps." 3
It is less  clear in a two-step merger than in a single step merger
that investors expect equal treatment.  While an inference  of such  ex-
pectation  is reasonable  in the  case of a negotiated  first  step, there is
room to  question that inference when the first step is a public tender
offer.  In the latter case, the premise of equal treatment with a control-
ler is absent.  However, even if there is little to establish that equality of
treatment in the second step is actually an expectation of investors gen-
erally, in most circumstances there is not yet a basis for concluding that
inequality of treatment is their expectation.  In the context of such am-
biguity, the absence of a requirment of explicit warning in advance of
initial investment leaves  little  reason to  deny a requirement  of equal
payment  on the second step  on the ground that it is  not expected.
Moreover, there is good  reason to impose such a requirement  in
view of the assumption of unhampered, if not uncoerced, free choice by
the offeree  as  the condition  which validates  the takeover-bid  price-
152.  Disparaties in the ability of offerees to respond to tender offers, Nathan & Yolk, Develop-
ments in Acquisitions and  Acquisition Techniques,  12  INST.  ON  SEC.  REG.  178,  181-82  (1981);
Welles, Inside the Arbitrage  Game,  INSTITUTIONAL  INVESTOR 41,  46-51 (Aug. 1981),  raise the fur-
ther question of unequal distribution of the merger proceeds between sophisticated and unsophis-
ticated  investors.  That  question  is  not  merely  academic,  as  is  shown in  the  SEC  proposal to
extend the  tender period for two-tier tender solicitations.  See Securities Exchange  Act Release
No.  19,336,  [Current]  FED. SEC.  L. REP.  (CCH)  83,306  (Dec.  15,  1982)  (promulgation of SEC
Rule 14d-8 regarding prorationing of  tender offer pools); SEC Tender Offer Committee:  Agenda of
Major  Issues Established During First  Meeting, CORP. L. GUIDE (CCH)  No. 634, at 6-7 (Apr.  12,
1983)  (discussion  of problem before  SEC advisory committee on tender offers);  Bebhuk, supra
note  82, at 46.
153.  Whatever may be the validity of objections to managerial efforts to obstruct tender offers
even  if those  efforts  are  made  solely in the interests of stockholders, see supra note  145,  those
objections do  not apply  to a rule of uniformity of price that is designed to prevent a whipsaw of
dispersed investors.
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both as a matter of fairness and as a matter of efficiency.  That condi-
tion is eroded if the coerced  second  step price  can  be lower  than the
tender-offer price. 1 54
B.  Sales of Control
Even if the principal  of equality should cover all transactions  in
which minority stockholders  receive distributions  or acquire  different
participations  in  a corporation,  the question  remains  whether  it  also
should cover transactions which entail no more than transfers by con-
trollers of their controlling shares to third persons.  Formally, the mi-
nority  shareholder's  participation is unaffected  by the transaction,  so
that there is no occasion to inquire about equal treatment.  From a less
formal perspective,  however,  although the minority has  neither  acted
nor received a different certificate or form of ownership, it is participat-
ing  in the corporate  enterprise  differently  than is  the  controller  and
than  it did  before  the transfer.  The  controller  now has  cash  and  is
"out"  while the minority continues to hold stock and is "in."
To be sure, the same description fits all  stockholders of all public
corporations  at all times.  Some stockholders  sell  and are  "out"  with
cash, while others remain "in" with stock.  There is a significant differ-
ence, however.  To the extent that a transfer of control results in a new
controller-manager, the enterprise is no longer the same.  The minority,
without its consent, is participating in a different enterprise as certainly
as if there had been a merger with a third party.  And it is not being
treated equally with the former controller in this effective merger.  The
minority is now being frozen  in, instead of frozen out.  Its continued
participation in the risks of the new enterprise may or may not have a
present value economically equal to the cash received by the controller.
It is  difficult, if not impossible, to tell.  Certainly in form, equal treat-
ment  is not being accorded.  The question  is whether either formal  or
substantive  equality  of  treatment  should  be  required  in  such
circumstances.
Judicial opinions often fail to see the problem as involving a rear-
rangement  of investor  participations  in the corporation-for  which  a
154.  To assure precisely equal treatment would require not merely payment of the same sum
per share on the second step as on the first, but also compensation  for the delay, in the form of an
appropriate  return on  the delayed payment.  While such  precision would  be  appropriate  if the
problem were the propriety  of controllers'  diversion of some portion of the purchase  price  from
public investors, there is less reason to insist upon such meticulous equality when the recipients of
the first payment  are  themselves dispersed public investors  who  bear no responsibility  for any
disparity  resulting  from  the delay  in payment.  And the size  of that disparity is  limited by  the
limited  duration of the period between the two  steps which  is a tolerable condition of finding  a
unitary transaction  rather than a long-term  parent-subsidiary merger.  For the latter,  equality is
measured on a common  stock basis rather than by  the tender price.
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rule of equal treatment would be required.  Instead, they are tinctured
by a concern with the property rights and liquidity of the controllers  as
owners of shares of stock.  Subject to the tort restriction against an act
(i.e., the transfer) which injures other stockholders, controllers'  freedom
to dispose of their personal property at whatever price they can get' 55
has remained  a predominant  factor in sale of control  cases.1 56  From
that perspective, there is no need to assess the unequal consequences to
investors of a single transaction in the commonly owned corporate  as-
sets.  The courts' failure to perceive the sale of control as a transaction
which alters and to some extent  thereby sells some of every investor's
participation in the enterprise may reflect judicial myopia.  But the ra-
tionale of the opinions with that view does not deny that a rule of equal
treatment for investors should prevail if the transaction were seen as a
rearrangement  of everyone's participation in the enterprise.157
Nor does the property-based  rationale establish the principle that
ownership  of control  entitles  the  controller  to  better  treatment  than
other stockholders in the distribution of corporate assets. 15 8  It is princi-
pally academics  who see  the cases  as  establishing  that proposition. 59
155.  See Clagett v. Hutchison, 583  F.2d  1259 (4th Cir.  1978); McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d
545 (10th  Cir. 1969); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173,  178 (2d Cir.) (Swan, J., dissenting), cert.
denied,  349 U.S. 952 (1955);  Ritchie v. McGrath,  1 Kan. App. 2d 481,  571 P.2d 17 (1977);  Tryon v.
Smith,  191 Or.  172, 229 P.2d 251 (1951); cf. Yerke v. Batman, 176 Ind. App. 672, 376 N.E.2d 1211
(1978)  (duty ofseller is to corporation, not to its remaining stockholders).  But cf. Zetlin v. Hanson
Holdings, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 684, 397  N.E.2d 387, 421 N.Y.S.2d  877 (1979)  (valid interest of control-
ler in the premium  derived from corporate control).
156.  See Gerdes v.  Reynolds,  28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup.  Ct.  1941);  Perlman v. Feldmann, 219
F.2d 173,  178 (2d Cir.) (Swan, J., dissenting), cert.  denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).  Even in such cases,
the  vision of stock  as fully transferable  personal property seems  to impel courts to narrow the
seller's duty to ascertain  (or even to note) the buyer's tortious potential to injure the corporation.
See, ag., Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 57.  (4th Cir. 1973);  Levy v. American Beverage  Co.,
265  A.D. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517  (1942).
157.  Cf. Seagrave  Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954); W. CARY  & M.  EISENBERG,
supra note 3,  at 683-88.
158.  But cf. Zetlin v. Hanson  Holdings, Inc.,  48 N.Y.2d  684, 397 N.E.2d  387, 421  N.Y.S.2d
877 (1979).  The form in which the cases generally reach the courts-a request by the minority for
equal sharing of the controller's premium--suggests that a denial of the plaintiff's claim is a denial
of a rule of equal treatment.  But,  if the denial of equal shares in the premium is  based upon a
view of the transaction that does not see any common involvement of all stockholders,  or even of
all the corporate assets, in the transaction, what is denied is merely the nonseller's right to partici-
pate in the proceeds of a transaction in personal property in which the nonsellers have no interest.
There  is no denial of a right to share equally in the proceeds  of the sale of corporate assets.
159.  See, eg., Toms, supra note 94, at 560; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 715-16; see
also Chazen, supra note 71,  at 1467-70.  To academics,  who tend to view the transaction more
broadly as  a transfer of some interest of the nonsellers in the corporation, inequality in the divi-
sion of the  premium  also may not mean that the minority  is not (except  in form) denied equal
treatment or that they are not entitled to it. The buyer is presumed to expect a higher value for the
corporation than its market price, and a higher value  even than the premium  price.  While aca-
demics are fuzzy about the present value of that expectation, such an expectation (and an aura of
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And they go on from there to argue that that proposition undermines
the rule of equal treatment  in mergers,  if not also  in liquidations. 6
The question they pose in the sale of control cases is whether the cost of
departing from a rule of equality (in substance, not merely in form) is
worth the gains it offers to investors  and society.
If no increase in the value of the enterprise were envisionable from
the sale of control, the only reason to permit departure from the princi-
ple of equality would be to protect the controllers'  freedom to transfer
his stock. If the transfer  offered no possibility of enhancing enterprise
value, the  only reason for the  buyer  to pay  a premium  would  be to
appropriate  some portion of the minority's assets to itself.  There is lit-
tle more rational basis for permitting such premiums to be kept by sell-
ers than for permitting such appropriation  by buyers.
Accordingly,  the  essential  justification  for  permitting  departure
from a rule of equality is the probability  of an increase in enterprise
value coupled with the necessity  for such a  departure  in order to  en-
hance that probability.  That rationale is only a justification, however,
if  the  benefits  to  minority  stockholders  and  to  society  from  the
probability of an increase in enterprise value exceed the costs of a rule
of disparate treatment.
To the extent  that the  probability  of increasing  enterprise  value
chel, supra note 8, at 705.  Without  it, they would be hard pressed to justify either such a sale of
control as a rational ex ante expectation of a public investor, or a rule allowing  the premium.
160.  See Easterbrook  & Fischel, supra note 8,  at 705, 715; Cohn, Tender Offers and  Sales of
Control, 66  IowA L. Rav. 475  (1981);  W. CARY  & M. EISENBERO,  supra note 3, at  683-88.  The
circularity of arguing from a rule allowing controllers  a premium  on sale of control to a rule  of
disparate sharing in distributions and mergers is matched by making the contrary argument in the
reverse order.  But the circle can be broken.  Premiums  extracted by sellers in simple sale of con-
trol transactions rest on the controller's ability to capitalize his power to enjoy perquisites while in
control because  the fiduciary or contractual rules prohibiting  such perquisites  are not rigorously
enforceable.  It by no means follows from a rule permitting the controller to keep those premiums
that disproportionate  division is appropriate in either two-step  arm's-length mergers or in purely
internal reshuffles such as parent subsidiary mergers or going private transactions.  The absence of
third-party  valuations and  contributions,  and the  presence  of self-dealing,  make  the  latter  two
cases entirely different from sales of control.  And the fact that in arm's-length mergers minorities
are formally forced to accept different claims with different tax and investment consequences justi-
fies  an accounting  by the controller, in conformity with the minority's contractual  expectations.
That justification  for requiring  an accounting is absent in a simple sale of control.  On the other
hand, the premises on which a rule of equality rests in internal reshuffles and arm's-length mergers
are powerful enough to support, if not require, a similar rule with respect to premiums in sales of
control.
The limitations on the effective application of fiduciary strictures on controllers'  diversion of
assets during continuing operations should not become the basis for creating property rights in the
capitalized value of those limitations or for declining  easy applications of those strictures on sale
or  reorganization  of the enterprise.  Such  application of those strictures to control  transactions
certainly would not discourage, and might well encourage,  improved effectiveness of the fiduciary
rules as they  apply during continuing operations.
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turns on encouraging  buyers to bid, Andrews' 61 -and  the tender offer
movement-have  demonstrated  that there is no need to depart from
the rule of equal treatment in order to induce buyers to seek to acquire
a controlling interest.  If all that a buyer seeks is control, he can acquire
it by tender offer without departing from the rule of equality. There is
no reason  to believe that the cost  to the buyer  in a tender  offer will
systematically  be  any higher  than the  cost  of a negotiated  sale by  a
knowledgeable controller.  Dispersed stockholders are not in a position
to extract a higher price (i.e., to negotiate with the buyer) than would a
controller.
62
Whether the likelihood of a transfer of control  (and a presumably
better use of the enterprise's  assets) is significantly changed if the con-
troller cannot get a premium is another question.
1 63  That the controller
is more likely to sell if he is allowed  to keep a higher price than if he
were required to share "equally"  with the public stockholders may be
conceded.  If not just greed, then  a felt  entitlement  to capitalize  the
perquisites  of continuing  control  will stimulate  an interest  in  a pre-
mium.  To  defer to the  controller's  desire to  be paid the  capitalized
value of the improper agency perquisites in order to induce a new agent
to reduce agency costs hardly suggests that agency costs will in fact be
reduced.  Nor does it suggest that public investors will be encouraged
to invest.16
It  is not  self-evident that the  cost  to the minority of allowing  a
controller so to exit and turn over control of the minority's assets is less
than the benefit the minority and society may gain from allowing the
new controller so to enter.  There is ample room for debate over how
161.  Andrews,  The Stockholder's Right to Equal  Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARv.
L. Rav. 505  (1965).
162.  But ef.  Easterbrook & Fischel, supra  note 8, at 705 (tender offer more costly than private
purchase of control).
163.  See Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares: A  Reply to Professor
Andrews, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 420 (1965);  Manne, Mergers  and  the Marketfor Corporate  Control,
73 J. POL. ECON.  110,  116-17  (1965).
164.  If agency costs can be said to reflect the advantages to agents of both diversion potential
and "quiet life" potential, the premium paid to the controller is likely to reflect more significantly
the benefit to the acquirer of the potential for unpoliceable  diversion that the controller is giving
up.  But the successful acquirer is not likely to sacrifice that potential in the interest of the remain-
ing public stockholders.  There is no reason to believe that if the acquirer should reduce or elimi-
nate the  cost to the public of the "quiet life"  potential it will be by amounts  that will offset, let
alone exceed,  the cost of the continued  diversionary potential.
It is  possible for an acquirer to pay  a small premium  (e.g.,  10%)  for 50% of the stock of a
corporation, not in the expectation of "improper"  diversion but in the belief that better manage-
ment will increase the aggregate value of 50% of the stock by more than the amount of the pre-
mium.  But to the extent that such an expectation implies some indeterminate reward to the buyer
for his managerial and entrepreneurial talents, it affects the likelihood of a sufficiently large in-
crease in the aggregate value of the enterprise to give the nonsellers the equivalent of the premium
received  by the seller.
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that question  is to be answered  systematically.  But there is no  doubt
that sale of control to a buyer who, by definition, is not seeking  100%
ownership  leaves the minority with the possibility of a loss, not merely
with a  disparate sharing of a gain.  And a controller who  can exit to-
tally does not search  for either the  most honest or the most  efficient
buyer, even if he is constrained by a duty of care.  Therefore,  the re-
maining  stockholders  are put  at risk  by  a  seller  who  systematically
looks to his own rewards  but ignores  the interests of others.  To that
extent, whether viewed  ex ante or ex post,1 65  departing from a rule of
equality  is less attractive  to a risk averse  investor than exposure to the
forced merger at a price no less than the market price preceding a suc-
cessful tender offer or negotiated purchase of control.
In sum,  considerations  both  of fairness  and  efficiency  support  a
rule of equal treatment for the stockholders of corporations whose con-
trol is transferred to third parties.  Such treatment requires that a buyer
who is prepared to pay a premium for purchase of control, but not for
100% of the enterprise, should offer the premium to all stockholders pro
rata, or the seller should divide the premium with the remaining stock-
holders; if a buyer pays a premium for control and, in a unitary trans-
action, acquires the balance of the target's stock, the buyer should pay





The rule of equal treatment also has implications for the division
of  those  gains  from  corporate  dividend  policy,  mergers,  or  control
165.  Hill, The Sale of Controlling  Shares, 70 HARv.  L. Rav. 986,  1033-34  (1957);  Note, The
Right of  Shareholders  Dissentingfrom Corporate  Combinations  to Demand  Cash Paymentsfor Their
Shares, 72 HARv.  L. REv.  1132,  1144-45.  Cf. supra note  19.  The ability to diversify  the risk of
such a sale of control, see supra notes 23 & 82, is not so clear as to preclude  the question whether
the  increased cost of capital would be wasteful.
Whether  a seller  of control should  be obliged  to accept  a smaller  premium  from  a buyer
seeking all the stock and forbidden from accepting a higher premium from a buyer seeking only
control, see, eg.,  Blackmon v. Carson, 65 A.D.2d 731,  410 N.Y.S.2d 294 (1978),  presents  another
question.  Since the controller  is not obliged to sell at all, one alternative for him is to hang on if
he is not satisfied with the smaller premium.  Cf. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson  & Co.,  1 Cal. 3d  93,
115-18,  460 P.2d 464,476-78,  81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 604-06 (1969)  (controllers need not go public in a
coerced reorganization if doing so deprives minority of opportunity to participate in advantages of
publicly marketed stock).  But see Toms, supra note 94, at 571-72.  There is little reason to believe
that  a  seller who  wishes  to exit  will often  hang on rather  than  take  a smaller-i.e., shared-
premium.
166.  To the extent that the successful bidder's offering price can be said to undercompensate
the target's stockholders, see Lowenstein, supra note 27,  all of them--tenderers  and nontenderers
alike-are  disadvantaged.  It is  not obvious  that  an appropriate  remedy  for  that  disadvantage
need permit inequality of treatment of the two classes.  A different question is raised if the merger
is not a unitary transaction.
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transactions which do not technically become corporate  assets, but in-
stead benefit individual stockholders  separately.  Personal gains, such
as  tax benefits  or portfolio diversification,  may vary  from investor  to
investor not by reason of the corporate action's impact on the value per
share of stock but by reason of its impact on the individual investor's
wealth position.167  Whether the import of a rule of equal treatment for
gains  resulting  from  such corporate  action  should  be to  require  the
decisionmaker  to focus on increasing  corporate wealth rather than on
increasing  the aggregate  personal  wealth of individuals is  a question
that raises a number of subsidiary issues.  Its significance  is considera-
bly  diminished, however, if parts  of the controllers'  personal wealth
increment can be transferred to the minority stockholders  by requiring
the controller  to account  to the  corporation  for  benefits  he  received
from the transaction  which were not reflected  in increased  corporate
wealth.
There  are good reasons  to confine  corporate  decisions  or uses  of
corporate assets to efforts to maximize, and share, the collective worth
of the firm.  Other increases  which  such  decisions  or uses produce in
the aggregate personal wealth of individual  shareholders  are a matter
of separate  concern.  Considerations  both of equity and  of efficiency
support such separation.
So far as equity among stockholders is concerned, if investors with
diversified portfolios own stock in a particular company, some of them
will  almost certainly  be  affected  differently from  others by  particular
corporate  distribution or reorganization  decisions.  Indeed, in view of
the multiplicity  of personal variations, no rational investor would ex-
pect his personal  wealth preference  to determine such corporate deci-
sions unless all stockholders held the same preference.  For some kinds
of corporate action, such as dividend policy, an acceptable but not nec-
essarily optimal or enforceable  solution is offered by the possiblity that
clienteles of investors will form for particular companies with particu-
lar policies.168  For other decisions, such  as desired merger currencies
or terms, a "clientele"  solution is not feasible.  Only by attending to the
167.  See supra note  10.
168.  See Fischel,  supra note 126, at 704-06.  If an investor's personal preference is for retained
earnings (or dividends) for tax reasons or otherwise,  he can sell one  stock and find other invest-
ments whose dividend policies satisfy his need.  Such personal flexibility requires adequate infor-
mation about dividend policy, or other relevant  corporate policies.  While determination of the
"adequacy of information"  raises difficult issues, those issues are not immediately  relevant.
This solution is acceptable and optimal on the assumption that dividend policy follows from
investment decisions made  to maximize enterprise  values.  The difficulty of determining  in court
the purpose of the controllers'  investment  decision leaves  an  ambiguity  in the assumption  that
makes  the solution difficult to enforce.  Moreover,  if the assumption  is false, the solution is  not
optimal.  Comparable  problems of enforcement arise if dividend decisions can be made to maxi-
mize share values but not necessarily enterprise  values.
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impact of a decision  on the value of the corporate  assets or collective
proceeds  can management avoid systematically frustrating one group's
interests for the benefit of another's.  Any differential impact on indi-
vidual stockholders from  an announced  policy of attending  to collec-
tive value may properly be seen as fortuitous and not an unfair use of
corporate assets.
The matter is more complex with respect to optimal resource allo-
cation.  Generally, on standard free market assumptions, and certainly
in the absence of a feasible system of transfer payments, it is the impact
of a corporate decision on the firm's return per unit of risk, more than
its impact  on the varied  conifigurations  of shareholder  wealth,  that is
most likely to produce optimal use of the firm's resources.  If manage-
ment is confined to the task of enhancing collective wealth (and major-
ity stockholders are similarly confined) in the exercise of their power or
discretion with respect to the use of corporate resources there will pre-
sumably be a larger corporate pie to divide.169  Efforts to tailor corpo-
rate actions  to the varied configurations  of investors'  personal  wealth
suffer from the same difficulties  and perils  as efforts  to use corporate
assets  to  meet  investors'  other  personal  preferences. 17 0   They  pose
problems in the relationship of individual choice to collective action.  171
A focus  on increasing  material  wealth  (rather than  satisfying varied
nonpecuniary  preferences)  mitigates  the  severity  of those  problems.
But even so, a rule permitting deference to personal wealth preferences
of majorities will inevitably generate bundling costs. 172  To avoid those
costs requires  decisions  about the enhancement  of personal wealth to
be left to individual investment adjustments, instead of permitting such
considerations  to affect  collective  decisions  on  the  use  of commonly
owned assets.
On the other hand, it is possible that control or merger  transac-
tions or dividend decisions will increase aggregate stockholder  wealth,
notwithstanding the failure to increase  corporate wealth.  Each stock-
holder may share in the increment if the controller is required to make
transfer payments to the minority by accounting to the corporation for
his gain and their loss.  The matter is further complicated  because cor-
porate  transactions  that  produce  collateral  personal  benefits  for  the
169.  The  stated obligations  of directors  and officers to "the  corporation," see supra note  3,
rather than to particular stockholders  accords legal recognition to the primacy of enhancing col-
lective  wealth if collective assets are being used.
170.  See,  eg.,  Brudney,  Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights  Under the First
Amendment,  91  YALE LJ. 235  (1981);  Engel,An Approach to Corporate  Social  Responsibility, 32
STAN.  L. REv.  1 (1979).
171.  Seesupra note 11.  To be sure, the existence of a single controller reduces the significance
of those problems.
172.  See Brudney, supra note 170, at 264-65.
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controller  but  not  for  the  minority---e.g.,  a  leveraged  buyout  or  a
merger for stock of one acquirer rather than for more cash from  an-
other  bidder-may  or  may  not  optimally  allocate  resources. 173
Whether or not a rule that requires controllers  to share their personal
benefits or a rule that permits them to appropriate collateral  gains has
any effect on the appropriate allocation of resources, no less favorable
results are likely to follow from a rule requiring sharing  than from  a
rule that does not.174  And it will  cost less  by way of investor uncer-
tainty and the resulting impact on the cost of capital.175
Equality of treatment as the measure of sharing might be imple-
mented by requiring the controller to account for the amounts that the
minority  would have  received  if the controller had focused  solely on
maximizing corporate wealth; or it might be implemented by requiring
the controller to share all his personal gains.  When the decision maker
(whether controlling  stockholder  or hired manager)  has no collateral
173.  Thus, for example, consider the case of ESS corporation.  Its stock sells at $70.  Compet-
ing bids are  being made  for its assets:  AMP  corporation offers  cash in the amount of $100  per
share and BOX corporation offers its stock (share for share) which has a current market price of
$90  per share.  The holder of 51 percent of ESS stock prefers  the BOX offer because his low tax
basis for his  ESS stock makes BOX's stock worth more to him than AMP's stock.  If tax policy is
put aside, AMP's higher price presumably (but not necessarily) reflects a potential better social use
of the property than BOX would make; and by the same token BOX's offer presumably suggests a
better use than the controller is presently making.  If fiduciary rules require the controller either to
accept AMP's offer (because of the interests of ESS's minority in a higher price for the assets) or to
decline the transaction, he may rationally opt for the latter.  A rule which would permit the con-
troller to  make the  transaction without accountability would not produce  the best social use  (as
between AMP and BOX) and would disadvantage ESS's minority investors with a corresponding
social cost.  A rule which would require the controller to account would at least tend to further the
transfer to a better use than the controller makes and avoid the costs of minority investor uncer-
tainty.  In marginal cases, it might not further the transfer (because  the cost of the transfer pay-
ment might exceed the tax benefit to the controller), but it would be no less efficient than a rule of
nonaccountability.
174.  See supra note  173.  Since,  by  definition, the mooted uses  of corporate  assets  will not
subject  the controller  to any  special risk that does not also  affect the other investors,  no added
incentive to make such uses need be given to the controller.  And the consequence of any such use
is  to create a  likelihood  of failing  to maximize  the size  of the  corporate  pie, and  rarely  (e.g.,
dividend withholding) any likelihood of increasing  its size.  Hence, prohibiting  the transaction or
requiring accountability for private gains from it will rarely inhibit transactions that are useful to
society or to minority investors.
175.  Chazen suggests that ifin a merger proposal a target is offered $100  in cash or, alterna-
tively, stock of the  acquirer having a market price of $90,  the latter should be preferred  by man-
agement  if "there  is substantial  public shareholder  interest in  a tax free  alternative."  Chazen,
supra note 71,  at 1459.  Whatever may be the case for a disinterested management, a controller is
no more  entitled to make  that choice  than the controller would be to accept  an offer of a high
premium for himself and reject an offer of a lower premium for 100% of the stock. See Harman v.
Masoneilan Int'l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487 (Del. 1982).  But G. Blackmon v. Carson, 65 A.D.2d 731, 410
N.Y.S.2d 294 (1978).  If management negotiates  a sale for a cash/stock option at a price less than
the price in an all-stock or all-cash deal, that result may be justified on Solomonic principles.  But
that justification  would  not be  equally  applicable  if  the Solomonic judgment were  made  by a
controlling stockholder.  See Schreiber  v. Carney, 447 A.2d  17,  26-27 (Del. Ch.  1982).CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1072
personal interest in the result of the decision, it is reasonable to assume
he is attempting  to maximize  corporate  values.' 76  But when the con-
trolling stockholder has such a collateral personal interest, as in a lever-
aged buyout, it is no longer so clear that corporate value maximizing is
likely to be the result.  To test the noncontrolling stockholders'  entitle-
ment  by assuming  that the controller would have sought to maximize
stockholder  wealth  if he had not been diverted  by  his own interests,
involves a search for what might have been.
In recognition of the intractable difficulties of that search, the legal
response  is frequently to impose categorical prohibitions of such trans-
actions or a requirement of accountability for personal gains from them
instead  of merely  imposing  liability for losses  or  lost profits.177  The
propriety of requiring such an accounting and of imposing liability  on
the controller for losses to the firm 7 1 is clearest where corporate assets
are diminished by reason of the decision.  It is puzzling, but should not
detract from that conclusion, that requiring an accounting or imposing
liability in such cases is far from uniformly accepted.'7 9 Where  failure
to  maximize  corporate  wealth  is  genuinely  disputable-as  in  simple
176.  To assume value maximizing goals for the enterprise as a predicate for measuring equal-
ity of allocations of corporate wealth is not to penalize officers, directors, or controlling sharehold-
ers for failure to achieve  those goals, as long as they have no collateral personal preference  as to
the results of corporate action.  The duty of care to which officers and  directors, and presumably
controlling stockholders,  are held sets a floor on the required  extent of their efforts to maximize
enterprise value, on the assumption that  they are  devoting all  the attention  they  are required  to
give to corporate affairs to enhancing corporate value.  It does not prescribe  sanctions  for failure
by honest effort to maximize that value.  But it predicates  the duty of care on the exercise  of best
efforts so to maximize.  If the  "best efforts"  are compromised by  the presence of a collateral per-
sonal interest,  the modest requirements of the duty of care should cease to be the governing crite-
ria for assessing the propriety of corporate decisions.
177.  See  Mosser v. Darrow, 341  U.S. 267 (1951);  Young v. Higbee Co.,  324 U.S.  204  (1945);
Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d  121  (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 709  (1935); see also
REsTATEMENT  OF TRUSTS §§ 205, 206 (1959);  4-f. Arizona v. Maricopa  County Medical Soc'y,  102
S.Ct.  2466, 2473  (1982)  ("The costs of judging business  practices  under the rule of reason,  how-
ever,  have been  reduced  by  the recognition  of per se rules.").  These  considerations  argue for
prohibiting leveraged  buyouts.
178.  See supra note  174.
179.  This may  be seen from  examination of judicial  and other comment on corporate  deci-
sions in a variety of contexts.  Illustrative is the decision to merge for stock (or cash) of the acquir-
ing corporation rather than for a greater present value in cash (or stock). See Chazen, supra note
71, at 1457-58; Harman v. Masoneilan Int'l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487 (Del. 1982).  Disclosure of conflicts
of interest may be required under the securities laws, but even adequate disclosure  does not solve
the difficult valuation problems.  See Lewis v. Oppenheimer  & Co., 481  F. Supp.  1199 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); In  re Spartek Corp., Securities Exchange  Act Release No.  15,567,  [1979 Transfer Binder]
FED.  SEc.  L. REP.  (CCH) %  81,961  (Feb. 14, 1979); see also Securities Exchange Act Release No.
15,572,  [Current]  FED.  SEc.  L.  RaP.  (CCH)  1 24,115  (Feb.  15,  1979).  It may  also  be  seen  in
decisions  to waste  enterprise value  by  distributing  portfolio  securities  rather than  cash  or vice
versa, see, e.g., Warshaw v. Calhoun, 42 Del. Ch. 437, 213 A.2d 539, 542 (Del. Ch.  1965), aft'd, 221
A.2d 487  (Del. 1966);  or decisons to buy up stock whose value was depressed by  dividend with-
holding, see Gabelli & Co., Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Ligget Group,  Inc. 444 A.2d  261 (Del. Ch.
1982);  Berwald v.  Mission  Dev.  Co.,  185 A.2d  480 (Del.  1962);  or to  pay out  dividends  at  the
expense of corporate opportunities, see Sinclair Oil Co. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717  (Del.  1971). But
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dividend withholding-there  is less basis for categorically requiring an
accounting  for personal gains. 8'  And there  is  even less  occasion  for
such  an  accounting  where the use made  of corporate  assets  (by one
form of merger rather than another equally available form) cannot di-
minish  or  fail  to  maximize  the  enterprise  value,  even  though  it  in-
creases the private wealth of the controlling stockholder. I8
Any remedy short of a categorical prohibition of collateral benefits
implicates procedural  safeguards and a variety of forms of relief. Bri-
gading appropriate  forms of relief and safeguards with particular trans-
actions or types of transactions is a traditional task for courts.  But how
that task should be performed and whether legislative or administrative
aid  is necessary  to facilitate  its performance  are subjects  for another
inquiry.
CONCLUSION
There is ample reason to believe that when a publicly held corpo-
ration  makes  distributions  or reallocates  participations  in  the  enter-
prise,  public  holders  of  its  common  stock  expect  to  share  in  the
resulting gains  equally per share with  controlling  stockholders.  That
expectation is not only generated by the normal common  stock invest-
ment contract, but by the circumstances in which investors are induced
to  buy  stock  and  by  the  general  understanding  of  the  financial
community.
No less important, that expectation is one which rational investors
should hold in a world of less than perfect markets.  Even if it would be
rational for public investors in a world of perfect markets to consent to
unequal sharing of the gains but to expect to be no worse off (measured
by the market price of their stock) than they were before the distribu-
tion or reorganization, the perfect market does not exist for such trans-
actions.  Controllers'  power  to  affect  the  market  price  of  stock  in
anticipation  of a distribution or internal reorganization  (by withhold-
ing information or by manipulation) is apt to make that price systemat-
cf. Schreiber  v. Bryan, 396 A.2d  512 (Del. Ch. 1978)  (shareholders'  derivative suit alleging waste
of corporate  assets and diversion  of corporate opportunity).
180.  Hence  a controller's  decision  to withhold dividends  must be tested  on a case-by-case
basis--on whether it is sufficiently likely to constitute a use  of corporate assets  which enhances
corporate  value.  Although it has been suggested that withholding  dividends should be categori-
cally forbidden, K. Brewster, The Corporation  and  Economic  Federalism,  in THE CORPORATION  IN
MODERN  SociETY 72 (E. MASON  ed. 1959), such a prescription  for the normal course of business
confronts  insurmountable hurdles, both theoretical  and practical.
181.  See,  e.g.,  E.I.  du Pont de  Nemours  & Co.  v. Collins,  432  U.S.  46  (1977);  Perlman v.
Feldmann,  219 F.2d  173,  177  (2d  Cir.), cert. denied, 349  U.S.  952  (1955).  In such cases,  if the
controller can show that the enterprise value or the minority's share could not possibly have been
enhanced by consummating the transaction in some other form or by not consummating it at all, it
may be unnecessary  to require  an accounting.
1983] 1131CALIFORXIA LAW REVIEW
ically  inaccurate  as  a  measure  of the  minimum  value  to which  the
public  investor  is  entitled.  Hence,  there  is  a  fatal  flaw  in  a  regime
under  which  controllers  are  entitled  to  take  more  than their aliquot
share of the gains but not more than an amount which will leave public
investors  no  worse  off-or  even  somewhat  better  off-than  market
price made them.  As economic agents, controllers  will seek to take as
much  as  they  can,  including  part  of the  public's  prereorganization
value.  They  can do this because  the amount of that value will be  re-
corded  by  a  market  price  that  they  can  make  disadvantageously
inaccurate.
Hence, a rule of unequal sharing is unfair, if only because it frus-
trates public investors'  reasonably induced  expectations  of equal shar-
ing.  It also is likely to be inefficient because  it has costs, in terms both
of increased investor uncertainties and therefore cost of capital, and of
temptations to controllers to engage in wasteful transactions in order to
effect personal gains.  Those costs may well exceed, and certainly can-
not be shown to be less than, the gains claimed to depend upon such a
rule, at least in the case of purely internal rearrangements.
When  the rearrangements  involve contributions  by  third parties,
such as in arm's-length mergers or takeovers, the gains dependent upon
a rule authorizing  unequal  sharing may be  somewhat  larger;  but, as
with internal transactions, the relevant gains  are only those that con-
trollers would not accept without disparate sharing.  The costs, at least
in the case of negotiated mergers or sales of control, are likely to be no
less than in purely internal rearrangements.  And, given the controllers'
unilateral  appropriative  impulses, they are more  likely  to be realized
than are the expected gains.
To the extent that they rest on investor expectations of equal treat-
ment, considerations of fairness may be somewhat  diluted  in sales  of
control or two-step  takeovers  as  compared  with internal reshuffles. 8 2
But there is little reason to believe that investors expect unequal treat-
ment in any of the types of third party transactions.  Hence,  in the ab-
sence  of express  admonition  in  advance  about  exposure  to  unequal
treatment,  a rule of equal treatment is preferable  in  such cases.
A rule of equal treatment is hard to make operational because de-
termining equality of distributions almost inevitably depends upon val-
uations  in judicial proceedings.  In that process, the protesting  public
stockholder is at a significant disadvantage in obtaining and presenting
relevant  evidence-in  terms  both  of cost  and  of likely  effectiveness.
Hence  enforcement of the rule is likely to be most effective if it avoids
182.  Additional  considerations  of fairness, not applicable  to sales of control,  underlie a  re-
quirement  of equal treatment  in two-step  takeovers.  See supra  text accompanying  note 154.
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the need for such a valuation process  and relies upon categorical stric-
tures.  But if application of such strictures is impossible or thought to
be too costly, then procedures must be sought to make testing of equal-
ity in individual cases more feasible-as by appointing negotiators for
the public investors, requiring intervention of administrative agencies,
or encouraging more active intrusion by courts that are able to obtain
expert assistance of their own.